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Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination
Erik Luna*
As this symposium demonstrates, criminology has much to offer
criminal law and procedure. But there are limits to this endeavor, such
as when public policy is distorted by powerful emotions that ignore the
lessons of legal doctrine and social science. This article presents one
possible response in such circumstances: expanding the interdisciplinary
relationship to include literary and cultural materials usually associated
with the humanities. These works can inspire the public imagination in
ways that law and criminology cannot, at times offering an alternative
narrative to counter emotion-driven claims of necessity, for instance, and
raising the exact type of questions that legal doctrine and social science
can help answer. As a case in point, the article considers the post-9/11
narrative of fear that paved the way for various deviations in criminal
law and procedure. It then suggests that dystopian fiction provided an
alternative image of authoritarian abuses to contrast with the
representations of government.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been more than four decades since renowned educator Clark Kerr
heralded the end of the classic university. Rather than a single group of scholars
and students working as one, the new model of higher education was a
multiversity, a dynamic institution composed of numerous communities.1 Its edges
were blurry and interests varied; it examined the remote past and distant future
while challenging the present; and it both generously served and harshly criticized
society. The model has problems, of course, some of which stem from its sheer
enormity and disjointed nature, prompting Kerr’s quip that the university had
become a collection of schools and departments united in frustration over campus
parking.2
Still, the institution as a whole was “extraordinarily flexible,

* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Many thanks to David
Harris, Wayne McCormack, and John Winterdyk for their comments, and to Daniel Goldman and
Thomas J. Moran for their research assistance.
1
“It is not one community but several—the community of the undergraduate and the
community of the graduate; the community of the humanist, the community of the social scientist,
and the community of the scientist; the communities of the professional schools; the community of all
the nonacademic personnel; the community of the administrators.” CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE
UNIVERSITY 14 (5th ed. 2001).
2
Id. at 15.
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decentralized, competitive—and productive,” a place where “[t]he new can be
tried” and “the old tested with considerable skill and alacrity.”3
Indeed, the modern university’s breadth made possible symbiotic
relationships among sometimes disparate disciplines, resulting in lively, productive
interaction and collaboration. The silo mentality that once prevailed in higher
education gave way to a more open-minded, comprehensive approach toward
topics of mutual interest in otherwise distinct fields, fostering some of the most
significant disciplinary advances in recent times.4 Such cross-fertilization has been
particularly valuable in the natural sciences, where biology, chemistry, and physics
have combined to form hybrids like biophysics and neuroscience.
Interdisciplinarity has also had an enormous impact on the social sciences and
humanities, especially in combination with the study of law, which has long been
viewed as an arena of allied disciplines examining “the whole field of man as
social being.”5 Some argue that law is an inherently parasitic discipline,6 and
today the “law and” phenomenon7 is so pervasive that it is hard to identify purely
doctrinal scholars, individuals whose work does not draw upon, or at least dabble
with, non-legal fields. The interdisciplinary study of criminal law and procedure
has been no exception, and in fact, it was among the first legal areas to actively
pursue the insights of allied disciplines.8

3

CLARK KERR, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

IN

HIGHER EDUCATION, 1960–1980, at 127

(1991).
4
See, e.g., Thomas Bender, Response to Social Science Research Council, Negotiating a
Passage between Disciplinary Boundaries, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMED, 1945–
2005: DOCUMENTING THE NATIONAL DISCOURSE 284, 287 (Wilson Smith & Thomas Bender eds., 4th
ed. 2008):
[O]ne can argue that most of the important disciplinary innovations of the past century,
and especially the past half-century, derive from the incorporation of concepts or
methods from other disciplines. That is a powerful argument against disciplinary
parochialism, or, to put it more positively, a call to a disciplinary cosmopolitanism that
allows and encourages serious participation in a more general intellectual culture.
5
See, e.g., History of the Law School, U. of Chi. L. Sch., available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/school/history (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (quoting William Rainey
Harper circa 1900).
6
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Does Literature Work as Social Science?: The Case of
George Orwell, in ON NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: ORWELL AND OUR FUTURE 49, 49 (Abbot Gleason et
al. eds., 2005) (“Law is a parasitic discipline. It attaches to all human endeavors that involve either
disputes or cooperation between two or more people, which is to say that it touches all aspects of
human life, either as an unwelcome intruder or as an indispensable aid.”). See also Anthony
Bradney, Law as a Parasitic Discipline, 25 J. L. & SOC’Y 71 (1998); George L. Priest, Social Science
Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1983). But cf.
Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 15–16 (1986).
7
For example, law and economics, law and psychology, law and philosophy, etc.
8
See, e.g., Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (describing the history of criminal
law texts synthesizing cases and social science materials).
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Leon Radzinowicz, one of the twentieth century’s foremost criminologists,
noted in 1940 that “human thought long ago realized that the study of criminal law
alone cannot provide all the information necessary for a proper understanding of
the phenomena of crime.”9 The endeavor had been impeded by an “atomization”
of the subject matter and a failure to recognize legal doctrine “as dependent and
functional rather than as creative.”10 According to Radzinowicz, criminological
research was crucial in deciding, inter alia: what to criminalize and how much to
punish; how law enforcement should be deployed and what limitations should be
placed on its power; how the legal process should be structured and what varieties
of courts should be available; whether expert testimony should be allowed and
what weight it should be given; and how much discretionary authority should be
allocated to prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries.11
Since then, generations of criminal justice scholars have explored the
intersection between legal doctrine and social science.12 In this spirit, the current
issue of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law seeks a fresh examination of the
relationship between legal doctrine and social science, asking what criminal law
and procedure can learn from criminology. Undoubtedly, my fellow symposium
participants will offer important insights on an ever-evolving intersection, that area
where criminology enlightens the legal analysis of crime, punishment, and the
relevant processes. Like others, I support the endeavor and will continue to draw
upon this interdisciplinary work in my own studies. The following merely
suggests some limits as to what criminology can do for law, not in terms of the
theoretical and empirical knowledge it provides, but instead the impact that any
social or natural science can have on criminal justice policies and practices.
Some research may be effectively inaccessible to both policymakers and the
public, due in no small part to the monastic life of the university professor, the
peculiar nature of scholarly publication, and the technical language of most
academic writing.13 But valuable criminological work may also be marginalized
by human passions that subvert the authority of fact and reason. Strong emotions,
9

L. Radzinowicz & J.W.C. Turner, The Language of Criminal Science, 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
224, 224 (1940).
10
See id. at 226–27, 237.
11
See id. at 234–35.
12
Cf. Ellen G. Cohn & David P. Farrington, Crime and Justice and the Criminal Justice and
Criminology Literature, 20 CRIME & JUST. 265 (1996) (empirical study of most-cited criminal justice
scholars).
13
See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1988). For instance, the rhetorical
style of legal writing
tends to be formal, erudite, and old-fashioned. Its passages often are interspersed with
terms of art and Latin phrases, as though its user were removed from and slightly above
the general concerns of humanity. Indeed, the focus on general rules, which is one of the
contributions of professional voice, ensures the use of language that removes some of the
feeling and empathy that are part of ordinary human discourse.
Id. at 578.
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particularly fear and hatred, have a remarkable tendency to disengage rational
thought processes in favor of visceral responses, often punitive in nature. The
history of “moral panics” attests to the power of fear and hatred in social and
political action, including the creation and enforcement of criminal law.14 Against
this background, the present piece examines whether materials found in other
disciplines can inspire the public imagination, even in times of high anxiety, with
the goal of placing distortive emotions in perspective and facilitating sound public
policy.
The next part discusses the impact of criminological research on criminal law
and procedure doctrine, suggesting that any beneficial interaction can be
jeopardized when emotion drives criminal justice policy. The article then explores
the potential of an interdisciplinary response in such circumstances, beginning with
a brief overview of the law and literature movement. It considers whether literary
and cultural works can impact public discourse and decision-making about
criminal justice, including the possibility that a particular genre, dystopian fiction,
can provide insight when legal doctrine and social science have limited influence
on the oppressive tendencies of law enforcement.
America’s “war on terror” offers a case-in-point, with post-9/11 policies and
practices propelled by a narrative of fear and producing significant deviations in
criminal law and procedure. The article suggests that a contemporary piece of
dystopian fiction offered an alternative narrative of authoritarian abuses to contrast
with government fear-mongering and claims of necessity. Though highly
debatable whether any particular counter-narrative could bring about the public’s
rethinking of anti-terrorism efforts, the work was representative of the possibilities
provided by a broader interdisciplinary approach to criminal justice, one that does
not seek to replace the connection between law and social science but instead
complements and even facilitates this important intersection.
II. CRIME AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
In light of the collection’s theme, it is altogether fitting that the symposium
editor is David Harris, the nation’s leading authority on “racial profiling”15—the
use of race and ethnicity to single out individuals for heightened police
surveillance and investigation—a topic that, perhaps more than any other in recent
times, demonstrates the impact social science can have on the law. In the mid1990s, litigation-inspired empirical studies concluded that minority motorists were
being stopped at a disproportionate rate on the New Jersey Turnpike and
Maryland’s I-95, even though minorities were not more likely to be violating the

14
15

(2002).

See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
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law.16 Subsequent cases and reports examined racial profiling throughout the
nation, some corroborating the phenomenon.17 Although the methodology and
conclusions have been criticized,18 these studies made it hard for politicians to
deny flatly that discrimination was occurring on the streets and highways,
ultimately leading to compulsory data collection, new police guidelines, and bans
on racial profiling.19
Criminological research is also changing the process of eyewitness
identifications in pretrial lineups, showups, and photo arrays, and the assessment
of subsequent witness testimony in court. Historically, the fingering of the alleged
offender by an eyewitness provides the most powerful moment in a criminal trial,
effectively convicting the defendant.20 And yet “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known,” the Supreme Court opined more than four decades
ago, with “the annals of criminal law . . . rife with instances of mistaken
identification.”21 For years, social scientists have researched the relevant processes
and emphasized the danger of eyewitness error,22 but change has only come in the

16

See, e.g., id. at 53–72 (discussing racial profiling studies); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350,
352–53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (detailing results of statistical study of New Jersey
Turnpike); John Lamberth, Driving While Black: A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still Rules the
Road, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at C1.
17
For a recent racial profiling study, see IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, ACLU OF S.
CAL., A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
(2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47. See, e.g., Racial Profiling Data
Collection
Resource
Center,
DOJ
Investigations,
available
at
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/doj.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2009)
[hereinafter DOJ Investigations]; Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center, Federal and
State Litigation, available at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/litigation.php
(last visited Aug. 22, 2009).
18
See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 571 (2003); Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug
Interdiction Absent Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2005); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking
Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of
Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2004); Stephan Michelson, Driving
While Black: A Skeptical Note, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (2004). See also Heather Mac Donald, The
Myth of Racial Profiling, CITY J., Spring 2001, at 14, available at http://www.cityjournal.org/html/11_2_the_myth.html; Joel Rubin, LAPD Rejects Finding of Bias, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2009, at B4.
19
See, e.g., DOJ Investigations, supra note 17; Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource
Center, Legislation, available at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/legislation/ (last visited
Sept. 1, 2009).
20
See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[E]yewitness identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries.”); United States v. Langford,
802 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[J]uries almost unquestioningly accept eyewitness
testimony.”) (citing Watkins).
21
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
22
See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
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wake of modern DNA testing and the proliferation of innocence projects around
the nation, confirming that false identification has been a primary source of
wrongful convictions.23 Today, a number of jurisdictions have adopted new
identification procedures—like requiring that witnesses be informed that the
suspect may not be present and ensuring that lineup administrators are unaware of
which individual is the suspect—thereby employing scientific research to increase
accuracy and limit the possibility of misidentification.24
Another relatively recent example involves a much-debated criminological
hypothesis: the so-called “broken windows” theory. First articulated by James Q.
Wilson and George L. Kelling in 1982,25 the theory proposes that low-level
criminality and threats to the quality of life—vandalism, littering, panhandling,
loitering, and so on—not only beget more of the same but may also set the stage
for more serious crimes and violence, driving respectable folks from affected
neighborhoods. Conversely, cracking down on these petty offenses supposedly
inhibits anti-social behavior, providing law-abiding community members a reason
to stay. In the succeeding years, the theory was put into effect in cities across the
nation. For instance, New York City implemented a “zero tolerance” policy on
vandals, turnstile jumpers, public drinkers, and aggressive panhandlers, while
young toughs in Chicago were rousted from street corners pursuant to a gangloitering statute. Broken windows-based policing was lauded for reducing crime in
urban areas,26 a claim championed by at least a few researchers.27 Other social
(rev. ed. 1996); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
277 (2003).
23
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent:
Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283 (1988); Gary L.
Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,
22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998). Cf. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
24
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-5 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf; N.J. ATT’Y GEN.,
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
(2001), available at http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf; WIS. ATT’Y GEN., MODEL POLICY
PROCEDURE
FOR
EYEWITNESSES
IDENTIFICATION
(2005),
available
at
AND
http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf.
25
See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29.
26
See, e.g., WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING
BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996).
27
See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990); Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken
Windows, 48 J.L. & ECON. 235 (2005); Kees Keizer et al., The Spreading of Disorder, SCI., Dec. 12,
2008, at 1681; George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter?: An Analysis of the
Impact of New York City’s Police Reforms, CIVIC REP., Dec. 2001, available at www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf.
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scientists challenged the theory with their own studies, refuting any connection
between belligerent enforcement strategies and lower crime rates.28
The broken windows experience thus exemplifies the potential influence of
criminology on the enactment and implementation of law, and the controversy this
may engender. Social scientists can disagree on the effects of a given criminal
justice policy, the differences attributable to any number of sources—from the
employment of distinct models and assumptions, to the host of errors that occur in
empirical work. But the interaction between criminology and criminal law and
procedure brings up a separate point of contention, one of equal importance: Given
a particular criminological theory or body of empiricism, what should be done as a
matter of legislation and enforcement? The question was raised with the broken
windows theory and its various applications. For several years, scholars sparred
over the constitutionality of Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance,29 with all sides
claiming a superior understanding of the issues in terms of doctrine and social
science.
In Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court struck down the law as
unconstitutionally vague.30 Along the way, it noted “the myriad factors that
influence levels of violence,” making it “difficult to evaluate the probative value of
this statistical evidence, or to reach any firm conclusion about the ordinance’s
efficacy.”31 This fleeting reference aside, however, the Court sometimes decides
legal issues steeped in criminological work without any mention of the scholarly
background. When Miranda v. Arizona was under reconsideration in 2000—

28

See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime
Control in New York, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 191 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed.,
2003); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New
York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); Steven D. Levitt,
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do
Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004).
29
Compare Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998), Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated
Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, and Tracey L.
Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 245, with Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999), David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999). See also URGENT
TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds.,
1999).
30
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
31
Id. at 49 n.7 (citing and quoting Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique
of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and OrderMaintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 296 (1998)). But see id. at 99–100
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence supporting ordinance).
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specifically, whether its historic formulation of required warnings for custodial
interrogation could be supplanted by a statutory balancing test for voluntary
confessions—the Justices made no mention of the vast body of research on police
interrogation since the Court’s original decision.32
Other times, an opinion’s doctrinal analysis begs for empirical support, but it
fails to cite relevant research (or, conversely, the absence of such work). Consider
the operative standard for state action in Fourth Amendment cases—stemming
from the Court’s 1966 decision in Katz v. United States—which asks whether
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”33 an individual’s expectation of
privacy. Although the standard would seem to demand data on society’s privacy
expectations, the Court has taken a distinctly non-scientific approach to the
preliminary question of search and seizure analysis.34 Another example emerged
just this past term, when the Supreme Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule
to unlawful searches resulting from law enforcement negligence.35 That decision,
Herring v. United States, was premised on what would appear to be an empirical
question—whether evidentiary suppression in such circumstances produces

32

See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Among the criminological issues was
whether Miranda impaired law enforcement’s ability to obtain confessions and therefore decreased
the clearance rate for crime. Compare Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. Rev. 1084 (1996), Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839
(1996), Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: Coincidence or
Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998), Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the
Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1055 (1998), and Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 387 (1996), with John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998), Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
278 (1996), Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996), George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World
Failure?: A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996), and
George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A “Steady-State” Theory of
Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996).
33
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
34
See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839 (2008). For an excellent
study attempting to assess society’s privacy expectations, see Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727
(1993). Cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (empirical study challenging Court’s
assumption regarding the views of reasonable jurors in police pursuit case).
35
See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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appreciable deterrence of unlawful police behavior36—and yet the Court made no
reference to any data or research.37
To be sure, criminology is no substitute for legal analysis and argument. It
does not replace the doctrine of criminal law and procedure, grounded in notions of
precedent and common-law reasoning, canons of statutory interpretation, theories
of constitutional law, and so on. But social science research can enhance the
process, informing criminal justice actors of the effects of their decisions as well as
supporting or challenging any analytical assumptions. This point was made a few
years ago by Tracey Meares and Bernard Harcourt, two scholars who had
disagreed on issues of criminal justice, including the broken windows theory.
Nonetheless, they joined together to call for a jurisprudence that “places empirical
and social scientific evidence at the very heart of constitutional adjudication,” an
approach that would more openly discuss the bases for factual claims and
normative conclusions, and provide a clearer reflection of the choices made in the
decision-making process.38 Although not a panacea, this social science “infusion”
could bring to light possible prejudice, Meares and Harcourt conclude, and thereby
make criminal justice decision-makers more accountable for their judgments.39
In general, then, it can be said that criminological theory and empiricism have
much to offer criminal law and procedure doctrine, and the incorporation of the
former into the latter should be fostered by scholars, legal professionals, and
policymakers. But there are some practical limits to the impact of social science in
criminal justice policy. As mentioned above, the public and its elected
representatives may have trouble assimilating scientific theories and empirical
studies into their decision-making processes, due to the density of the work or the
difficulty in translating it into mental images and practical guidance. On occasion,
however, the problem may exist on an affective level, with criminal justice
decisions distorted by powerful emotions that pay no heed to the lessons of legal
doctrine, let alone those of social science. In both circumstances, one possible
response would expand the interdisciplinary relationship beyond law and
criminology, using the materials and approaches typically associated with the
humanities and, in particular, those disciplines concerned with literature and
culture.
Once again, racial profiling offers a good example. In his work, Professor
Harris has used real-world stories to “bring to life” the data on racial profiling and

36

See id. at 699–700.
The deficiency can be compared to the case that established this line of analysis, United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), where both majority and dissenting opinions grounded their
arguments in empirical evidence. See id. at 907 n.6; id. at 950–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38
Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social
Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735
(2000).
39
Id. at 797–98.
37
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communicate the harrowing nature of the events and their aftermath.40 Although
race-based policing traces back through U.S. history,41 most of the nation only
started to take notice when the media began disseminating contemporary narratives
of racial profiling—especially cases where the victims were celebrities or the
officer’s behavior was exceedingly obnoxious—giving credence to a phenomenon
that had become well known in minority communities: D.W.B. (“Driving While
Black”).42 This type of story-telling may influence minds in a way that
criminological theory and empirics cannot. Narrative can provide a basis for
empathy with those embroiled in the criminal justice system, conveying the nasty
reality of criminal law and procedure on the streets and in courtrooms. While the
study of legal doctrine can be like chewing on sawdust, to use Franz Kafka’s
phrase,43 stories can make the issues concrete and compelling to the common
citizen and offer a contrast to the official representation of a rational, almost
mechanical criminal justice system. In this fashion, racial profiling narratives
brought to life legal arguments and criminological research, producing a
concurrence of public opinion and political drive at the turn of the millennium:
racial profiling exists, it is wrong, and it should end.44
Immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, this sentiment
changed dramatically. A majority of Americans now supported racial profiling, at
least when the targets were individuals of Middle-Eastern descent,45 and federal
law enforcement proceeded to do just that. Moreover, the executive branch
adopted a number of anti-terrorism policies and practices of questionable
constitutionality and reminiscent of authoritarian criminal justice systems of the
past. This often occurred with little debate or in-depth argument, and with limited
(if any) public understanding of the relevant legal doctrine or insights from allied
disciplines. Although the scholarly study of terrorism increased exponentially
after 9/11,46 this literature largely failed to influence the common citizen, whose
40
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black”
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 269 (1999).
41
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Foreword: The New Face of Racial Profiling, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 905,
906; Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 334–36 (1998).
42
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Rhetoric of Racial Profiling, in SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN
LEGAL DECISIONMAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 35 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007);
Luna, Racial Profiling, supra note 41, at 906–07. In Latino communities, the phenomenon has been
referred to as “driving while brown.” See, e.g., Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A
Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1
(2005).
43
See MAX BROD, FRANZ KAFKA: A BIOGRAPHY 41 (1995) (1937). See also IAN WARD, LAW
AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES ix (1995).
44
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 42; Luna, Racial Profiling, supra note 41, at 905–06.
45
See, e.g., Gross supra note 42.
46
See, e.g., Mathieu Deflem, Introduction: Towards a Criminological Sociology of Terrorism
and Counter-Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1
(Mathieu Deflem ed., 2004) (discussing increase in social science scholarship since 9/11).
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evaluation of government policy and practice was shaped not by reason, but by
base emotions, fear being chief among them. In times like these, the populace can
be especially susceptible to the worst kind of demagoguery, with tales of horror
prefaced by promises of greater security through reduced liberty. Legal doctrine
and social science may have little impact on public discourse when the people’s
collective judgment has been overwhelmed by intense emotions and government
claims of necessity.
The problem generalizes, as strong negative emotions like fear and anger can
impact all sorts of public policies. Leading scholars from both law and social
science, such as Cass Sunstein and Paul Slovic, have explored how emotion and
various cognitive biases and heuristics can affect risk assessment and response.47
People tend to evaluate risks based on the prevalence of mental associations—the
more available and horrific the image, the greater the perceived risk and the more
fervent the call for action. The media plays a leading role in this process,
amplifying the image with each broadcast and publication. At times, it can create a
misperception of popular consensus on the danger, the need for action, or the
propriety of a given response. Consider, for instance, the 1979 accident at the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, which neither killed nor injured a single
person. The combination of public fear and political pandering resulted in stiff
regulations, increased opposition to nuclear energy, and a global reduction in the
use of nuclear reactors.48 The consequences have proven significant, with nuclear
power rendered less viable as an energy source and alternative to those fuels that
create genuine problems.49
Criminal justice has been impacted in a somewhat similar fashion, best
exemplified by America’s increasingly harsh approach to crime. For several
decades, the United States has been on a punishment spree of unparalleled
proportions, sentencing more people and for longer periods of time. The prison
population has increased by about two million inmates since the early 1970s; the
average federal sentence has doubled since 1980; and now more than one in every
ninety-nine Americans is incarcerated, the highest percentage in the world and
many times larger than the ratio found in other Western nations.50 All told, the
47

See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS]. It should be
noted, however, that Slovic and Sunstein have important areas of disagreement. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1071 (2006) (book review); Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or
“Blunders”?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 166 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1110 (2006).
48
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1130 (2002)
(reviewing SLOVIC, supra note 47) [hereinafter Sunstein, Fear].
49
The principal example being the pollution associated with fossil fuel and the nation’s
dysfunctional relationship with major petroleum-producing nations.
50
See, e.g., Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL., Dec. 2008, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.pdf; Adam Liptak, More
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United States has become the single most punitive nation in the developed world.51
Yet most scholarship has concluded that increases in punishment do not effectively
reduce crime or increase public safety. For example, empirical research has
refuted the alleged benefits from two of the most discussed sentencing regimes:
recidivist statutes such as California’s “three strikes and you’re out” law and
obligatory punishment schemes like the federal five-year mandatory minimum
sentence for crack cocaine possession.52 Even those researchers who have found a
deterrent or incapacitative effect from mass incarceration nonetheless conclude
that the drop in crime rates is mostly a function of other factors, such as economic
prosperity.53 The social consequences of America’s punitiveness are substantial,
however, with some states spending more on prison than higher education,54 and
certain areas (especially poor, mostly minority communities) suffering utter
devastation from the loss of people, resources, and respect for law.55
Why would Americans and their elected representatives back such policies?
The answer is complex, but one prominent account involves the public’s
emotional, sometimes media-driven response to crime combined with the selfserving nature of government officials. In a series of articles, Sara Sun Beale has
examined the non-legal factors that influence criminal law and its increasing

Than 1 in 100 Adults Are Now in Prison in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A14; Defendants
Sentenced in U.S. District Courts, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5252007.pdf; Paul J. Hofer &
Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT’G
REP. 12 (1999).
51
See, e.g., Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime Across Space and
Time, in 33 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (Michael Tonry and David P. Farrington eds., 2006); Alfred
Blumstein et al., Cross-National Measures of Punitiveness, in 33 CRIME & JUST. 347 (Michael Tonry
& David P. Farrington eds., 2006); Richard S. Frase, Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the
Exceptional Severity of Sentencing in the United States, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 227 (2004)
(reviewing JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2004)); SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
(Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
52
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85–105 (2001); JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM
DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY? 143–44 (1997). But
compare Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the
Case Against California’s Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (2000), with Franklin E. Zimring &
Sam Kamin, Facts, Fallacies, and California’s Three Strikes, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 605 (2002).
53
See William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN
AMERICA 97 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., rev. ed. 2006); Levitt,supra note 28. See
generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE v–vi (2007); Ryan S. King et
al., Incarceration and Crime: A Complex Relationship, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 4 (2005), available
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf.
54
See N.C. Aizenman, New High in U.S. Prison Numbers: Growth Attributed to More
Stringent Sentencing Laws, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1.
55
See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008).
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punitiveness.56 Over the years, opinion polls reflected the public’s fear of crime, a
belief that crime was increasing, and a conviction that long sentences reduce
crime—even when crime rates were decreasing, and despite the aforementioned
studies on the relative ineffectiveness of incarceration.57 To a significant extent,
popular views on crime are impacted by its representation in the media, which is
the public’s primary source of information on criminal justice issues.58 Although
people tend to view the major media outlets as being fair and accurate in their
news coverage, economic concerns inevitably influence the selection of stories, as
well as their content and style of delivery. Beale’s work confirms the old news
adage that “if it bleeds, it leads,” with stories of crime and violence correlated with
market share and thus advertising revenues. Through the media’s depiction, crime
becomes more salient to audience members, who then view crime as a more
serious problem than indicated by the statistics.59
Although differing on the precise mechanism, scholars agree that the media
portrayal of crime increases the public’s demand for punitive policies—which, in
turn, provides populist incentives to lawmakers, who then create new crimes and
increase punishments. Such responses are easy for the public to grasp, generate
few opponents (other than civil liberties groups), allow the public to voice their
moral outrage, and, most importantly, bestow upon a campaigning politician the
gravitas of being “tough on crime,” a time-tested way to win an election.60 Law
enforcement also has an interest in get-tough policies, namely, the expansion of its
power. The more crimes on the books and the harsher the punishments, the more
power police and prosecutors can exercise throughout the criminal process.61 For
instance, harsh sentences bound by mandatory minimums provide the government
enormous leverage to extract plea bargains and information from defendants,
leading to more convictions and closed cases. Combine these elements—a public
frightened by crime, media outlets that exacerbate society’s fears, and government
56

See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How MarketDriven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006) [hereinafter Beale, News
Media’s Influence]; Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime?: Prospects for Restorative Justice in the
United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413; Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: The
Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997). See also Robert Reiner, Media-Made
Criminality: The Representation of Crime in the Mass Media, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 302 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
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See Beale, News Media’s Influence, supra note 56, at 418–20.
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See id. at 441–62.
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Id. at 442.
60
See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719–24
(2005).
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William Stuntz’s work has been especially insightful on these issues. See, e.g., William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); William J. Stuntz,
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officials willing to play on those emotions—and you may create a virtual breeding
ground for problematic criminal laws and procedures, flawed as a jurisprudential
matter and unsupported by social science.
The chain of events can begin with a single harrowing event that captures the
media’s attention and the public’s imagination, like the 1993 kidnapping and
murder of twelve-year-old Polly Klaas.62 The story horrified not only the victim’s
hometown of Petaluma, California, but also the entire country, receiving national
news coverage and stimulating a surge of public fear of crime and violence, all in
spite of declining crime rates. Prior to the incident, a “three strikes and you’re out”
bill had stalled in committee and appeared unlikely to receive even a general
legislative vote. But when the story broke that the purported killer had an
extensive rap-sheet, California lawmakers raced to revive the anti-recidivist
proposal and express their adamant support. Many used the incident and the
ensuing public fear to their political advantage, making “three strikes” the catchphrase of choice during the 1994 campaign. No politician dared oppose the law.
One state senator confessed, “I don’t think we have any choice [but to pass it],”
while another candidly admitted, “I’m going to vote for these turkeys because
constituents want me to.”63 In a perverse twist, the second largest financial
supporter of three strikes was a group interested in more inmates and
penitentiaries: the state prison guard union.64
The end result was a recidivist statute without theoretical or empirical
support. It is neither consistent with retributive principles, nor effective at
reducing future crime. Rather, the law was symbolic, a political recognition of
public fear—and an arational one at that. Markus Dubber described certain
recidivist laws as exercises of state power “without reference to rational
constraints, as if in a rational vacuum.”65 California’s law is a prime example of a
moral panic, a phenomenon that social scientists describe as an intense outburst of
emotions impeding reasoned deliberation and decision-making, often with

62
See Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 3–7
(1998) [hereinafter Luna, Three Strikes] (describing background of three strikes law). As enacted,
California’s law provides enhanced punishment for recidivists who have been previously convicted
of serious or violent felonies. See id. at 9–12; CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1999) (codified legislation);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (2004) (codified ballot initiative). Its most severe provision requires a
twenty-five year mandatory sentence for any felony committed by an individual with two prior
predicate felony convictions.
63
Luna, Three Strikes, supra note 62, at 5 n.37.
64
See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 436 n.242 (1997) (noting that the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association (CCPOA) donated the second-highest amount in support of the Three Strikes bill); Fox
Butterfield, Political Gains By Prison Guards, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at A1 (“[The CCPOA] has
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Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689,
689 (1995).
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implications for criminal justice.66 In these circumstances, people might lack the
type of information that checks fear, like the infrequency of the threat or the
limited harm it poses. Instead, a process known as “deviancy amplification”67 may
take hold. Maybe a minor or rare threat is deemed grave and frequent, with some
group demonized as a result. The public demands action, and the government
responds with tough laws and stern enforcement.
In this way, exaggerated public fear can generate support for authoritarian
action. Fear makes a citizenry politically manipulable and more inclined to accept
superficial arguments in support of harsh, far-reaching measures, with people even
embracing their own repression based on guarantees of safety and stability.68 This
is not to say that emotions are to be avoided or that they only have negative
repercussions for public policy. Emotions are pervasive and play a powerful role
in the way we view the world, often for the better. The difficult issue is the
interaction between emotions and values, and the ultimate impact on public
policy.69 Although sound decision-making does not merely convert passion into
law, it is not always easy to recognize and respond properly to unhelpful emotions.
How can we limit the negative impact of intense feelings about criminal justice,
particularly the sidelining of legal analysis and social science?
Public information and discussion provide the simplest response to
unjustifiable fears, but the educational approach is sometimes ineffective.70 This
may be particularly true if the state has an interest in fanning the fear, and the news

66
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communications scholar George Gerbner’s 1981 congressional testimony).
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about the fate of those detained or outraged about our government’s role in the abuse of
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Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra
421, 425, 427 (2008).
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media is complicit to some extent, such as when crime stories provoke high
anxiety (and high news ratings). Other responses are also possible, like lawsuits
by civil liberties organizations to contest government abuses. Here, I would like to
consider a different option: utilizing works of literature and culture to inspire the
public imagination and counter fear-provoking, rationality-impeding narratives.
The materials of an entirely different discipline may provide further insight on the
collaboration between criminal law and procedure and criminology. The question
is whether literary and cultural works could help defuse moral panics, allowing the
fruitful interdisciplinarity of law and social sciences to return from the sideline.
The next section begins with a mild, and mildly paradoxical, claim: One’s
understanding of reality can be enhanced by the imaginary, fictional accounts of
life and law, which can be compared with the prevailing vision of criminal justice.
These works confront the public with differing pictures, one that purports to be the
real world and another that maintains no such pretense, stirring individuals to ask
questions of those in power and to probe their own understanding of reality and
truth.71 This basic claim may be unobjectionable, but the piece continues with a
far more speculative contention: Provocative fiction can provide a counternarrative that helps shock the senses of an unduly compliant public, relating the
consequences of a people cowed by fear and willing to trade their rights for safety.
Fiction may contest overwrought media portrayals of crime, inflammatory claims
of politicians seeking reelection or higher office, and government officials acting
in pursuit of greater power. When individuals are presented with conflicting but
equally disturbing images—the narrative of fear and the counter-narrative of
authoritarianism—they may dispute government claims and ask the exact kind of
questions that thoughtful legal analysis and social science research can help
answer.
III. CRIME AND FICTION
A. Law and Literature
The use of parables and metaphors, “saying one thing and meaning
another,”72 is a time-honored means to elucidate issues of law and justice. But it
was not until the turn of the previous century that scholars attempted in earnest to
formalize the relationship between jurisprudence and literary works. Benjamin
Cardozo and John Wigmore endorsed this linkage—Cardozo exploring the literary
quality of judicial opinions, and Wigmore arguing that lawyers should be familiar
71

In Hawthorne’s words, “It is only through the medium of the imagination that we can
lessen those iron fetters, which we call truth and reality, and make ourselves even partially sensible
what prisoners we are.” NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, The New Adam and Eve, in MOSSES FROM AN OLD
MANSE 195 (2003) (1864).
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ROBERT FROST, The Constant Symbol, in THE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST, xv–xvi (1946). Cf.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING 191 (2001).
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with law-themed novels as a way to understand the human condition.73 For the
most part, however, the modern law and literature movement is traced to the 1973
publication of James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination,74 a textbook that
challenged people to see law as an art, which can be informed by literature’s
humanistic, anti-formalistic, mind-expanding possibilities. It sought to examine
law from the outside, to compare and contrast it to other intellectual pursuits, and
to see what is provided by literature but left out from legal analysis and texts.75
Other academics joined the discussion,76 pondering the relevance of literary
theory to the study of law and analysis of legal issues. The law-literature
enterprise actually comprises two distinct areas of inquiry: “law as literature” and
“law in literature.”77 The former branch is concerned with the interpretation and
application of law using the techniques of literary criticism, dissecting a given
legal text for its meaning and asking, for instance, whether the author, the reader,
social and historical ethos, or the text itself should be primary in interpretation.
Law as literature is controversial by nature, given obvious differences between the
two disciplines, not to mention law’s coercive force on real people.78 Questions
over methodology and suitable materials have become part of an ongoing debate
about whether literary theory can inform the interpretive function of lawyers and
judges.79
In contrast, law in literature deals with the representation of legal issues in
novels, plays, and other literary works. Although less controversial than its cohort,
this branch still raises concerns among supporters and detractors alike. “In its least
impressive forms,” Paul Gewirtz notes, “this sort of work can indulge in facile
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essays on law and literature).
77
Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1–2 (1988).
78
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
79
See, e.g., POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 74, at 209–95; Pierre N. Leval,
Judicial Opinions As Literature, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 206, 208
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).

88

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 7: 71

moralizing about law, using as a springboard a literary work whose focus on law is
marginal and whose moral complexity is reduced to a simple humanistic
message.”80 Whether his didacticism is overt or lies beneath the surface, the writer
is not duty-bound to moral neutrality. Viewpoints are inherent in literary works,
which may advance objectionable positions and practices just as easily as those
considered normatively justifiable. Literature can also distort the reader’s
perception, depicting the nature of life with simplistic causal chains, or intricate
layers of complexity, or an utter randomness of events. Its intoxicating effects
may even stimulate a certain promiscuity of argument.
All of this provides reason for caution, not abstinence. After all, literature can
grab the interest of readers in a way that law by itself cannot, placing people in
poignant situations filled with conflicts of life and law and their resolutions,
whether joyful or tragic. Though shaped by authorial subjectivity, a good literary
work does not overtly instruct the world on the “right” answers; instead, it invites
the audience members to discuss the story’s meaning and implications. Unlike
pure legal analysis, expertise and specialized knowledge are not prerequisites to
the endeavor. An individual can draw his or her own conclusions, based not only
on the text but also the individual’s interactions with other readers and society as a
whole.81
Literature can also provide insights into the lives of others and the human
condition in general.82 It allows the reader to understand what it means to be
someone else, a person with an entirely different socio-economic background and
set of experiences, creating a basis for empathy among individuals who might
otherwise feel no connection to one another. Even for a short period of time, a
white, upper-class professional suburbanite can become a poor, black youth in the
inner-city, for example, or a single, unemployed mother in a rural town, able to see
the world through their eyes and to appreciate the situations they face. Without
explicit prodding, readers are asked to imagine themselves in the shoes of another:
How would you feel? When the audience shares this experience, a more inclusive,
interactive basis for solidarity and community may be possible. We hear other
people’s stories, and they become our own. This is all the more relevant when
legal issues are at stake, particularly those of criminal law, which directly and
often violently impact real human beings.
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By broadening our consciousness of injustice, good narrative has an edifying
effect on the audience and can play a part in their moral education.83 In Poetic
Justice, Martha Nussbaum described a pair of benefits from the bookish endeavor:
Literature “provides insights that should play a role (though not as uncriticized
foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral and political theory,” and it
“develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making
reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however
excellent.”84 Although literary works cannot replace moral theory and legal
reasoning, they “can be a bridge both to a vision of justice and to the social
enactment of that vision.”85 Richard Rorty reached a similar conclusion, though on
different grounds than Nussbaum. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty
reiterated his skepticism that philosophical inquiry, in and of itself, can reveal the
causes of or solutions to systematic injustice.86 But a piece of literature can do
what high theory cannot: stimulate an awareness of our own prejudices and the
harsh practices tolerated by society. It may convey the “kinds of suffering being
endured by people to whom we had previously not attended” and the “sorts of
cruelty we ourselves are capable of.”87
Most important for present purposes, literature has the power to contest
current legal regimes, offering alternative visions that diverge with those held by
society. A literary piece can show how things actually work or, conversely, it can
inspire readers to imagine an entirely different world than their own.88 The law by
itself has no such capacity, offering only dry statutes, dense judicial opinions, and
stodgy legal articles. As Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg note in their study,
Literary Criticisms of Law:
83

See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE 8 (1995) (“[T]he novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical reasoning that is contextspecific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially universalizable concrete prescriptions
by bringing a general idea of human flourishing to bear on a concrete situation, which we are invited
to enter through the imagination.”).
84
Id. at 12. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers:
Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career
and Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (“[Narratives] elucidate important ethical choices—at
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micro-level of behavioral choices regarding what actions to take at specific junctures in one’s career.
Literature illustrates and ‘teaches’ us about ethics.”).
85
NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 12.
86
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiii–xiv (1989).
87
Id. at xvi. See also id. at 141.
88
Emerson described fiction writers as “liberating gods” with “a certain power of
emancipation and exhilaration for all men,” giving them “a new sense, and found within their world
another world, or nest of worlds.” RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The Poet, in COMPLETE WORKS: ESSAYS
33 (1899). “Whilst common sense looks at things or visible Nature as real and final facts, poetry, or
the imagination which dictates it, is a second sight, looking through these, and using them as types or
words for thoughts which they signify.” RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Poetry and Imagination, in
COMPLETE WORKS: LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMS 23–24 (1899).
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Arguably, the literary imagination can help us not only to conceive a new
and better legal regime, but also to imagine what living under alternative
regimes might feel like. Literature can offer a complex, multilayered
experience that transcends rigid categories, alerting us to the plurality
and dynamism of the meanings we attach to social life. And a literary
perspective could thereby encourage the lawgiver to eschew mechanistic
regulation in favor of an open-minded pluralism, to become an
empathetic, inclusive, and imaginative architect of the common good.89
Literature presents an external view of the law, one that allows the audience
to contemplate otherwise inconceivable questions: Does the reality of criminal
justice correspond to its official rendition as rational and fair, or instead does it
look more like an alternative world of the imagination? For this reason, “good
literature is disturbing in a way that history and social science writing frequently
are not,” Nussbaum suggests.90 A literary work can evoke strong emotions; it may
upset and confuse the audience; and it can challenge social conventions, the
wielders of brute force and subtle persuasion, and even the reader’s own beliefs to
the point of personal catharsis.91
B. Literature, the Public, and Criminal Justice Policy
Today, scores of scholarly books and articles have been published on law and
literature, complemented by academic symposia and entire journals dedicated to
this interdisciplinary study. They are filled with highbrow discourse and peppered
with the terms of the literary critic, where debates can amount to “family feuds”92
over particular applications. Such cerebral stuff rarely focuses on the average
citizen, and even if it did, the discussion might well be incomprehensible to the
public. Some scholars have criticized the movement precisely because of its
intellectual pretentiousness, insisting that the incorporation of law and literature as
a tool of understanding should appeal to a broader audience rather than just
furthering elite dialogue.93
Lawyers are no better, using a language foreign to the average individual—
“legalese,” as it is sometimes called. In particular, the idiom of criminal justice
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GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 3–4 (2000). See also
JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 9–10 (2002).
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NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 5.
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See id.
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See Richard H. Weisberg, Family Feud: A Response to Robert Weisberg on Law and
Literature, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69 (1988).
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See, e.g., Getman, supra note 13; WARD, supra note 43, at x.
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can be baffling to an ordinary person.94 At times, complex ideas and institutional
functions may necessitate terms of art, a specialized vocabulary that facilitates the
practice of law. But these situations may not be as widespread as some assume.
Occasionally, legal language and concepts may only serve to segregate the trained
from the untrained, thereby clouding or diminishing law’s import for society at
large.95 Fostering a discourse in a “human voice”96 seems especially important for
issues of crime and punishment, in light of the unparalleled authority of the state to
deprive individual liberty. Moreover, the overlap of literary interests between
scholar and average citizen is perhaps at its greatest when the criminal justice
system is at issue.97
So what types of material might offer the public a better understanding of law
in general and criminal justice in particular? The traditional canon of law and
literature includes the so-called “Great Books” of the Western world,98 with reams
of legal scholarship generated about these works and their authors. But there is no
authoritative criterion for determining whether a given text is proper material for
the law-literature enterprise, and no obvious reason to draw upon a work that may
have little appeal to the general population. In fact, some scholars of cultural
studies have extended their analysis beyond the classics to include popular fiction,
movies, television, and the like. One collection on law and literature contained
essays exploring newspaper articles, children’s stories, folklore, and John
Grisham’s books and associated movies.99 This broader body of work may be
particularly useful when examining criminal justice, given that issues of crime and
punishment are typically received by the public through published and broadcast
narratives, which, in turn, provide an understanding of society and human nature
that cannot be conveyed by legal doctrine and statistics.100
This more inclusive approach corresponds to modern life, where the
traditional novel constitutes only a portion of the compositions that impact society.
94
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 35–41 (2005) (discussing unintelligibility of federal sentencing guidelines).
Cf. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Making Sense of What We Do: The Criminal Law as a System of Meaning,
in HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 192 (1985).
95
See Getman, supra note 13, at 588. See also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 81, at 4–
5.
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Getman, supra note 13, at 582–88.
97
“Of all of law’s narrative arenas,” Gewirtz argues, “the criminal prosecution most fully
engages the public’s narrative desires and the scholar’s narrative speculations.” Paul Gewirtz,
Narrative and the Rhetoric of Law, in LAW’S STORIES supra note 79, at 2–3.
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See, e.g., Gemmette, supra note 76, at 682–92 (discussing the “great books” and the law
and literature canon); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND
LITERATURE 117–23 (1992).
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See TALL STORIES?: READING LAW AND LITERATURE (John Morison & Christine Bell eds.,
1996).
100
See Kieran McEvoy, Newspapers and Crime: Narrative and the Construction of Identity, in
TALL STORIES?, supra note 99, at 192.
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As Rorty suggests, “the novel, the movie, and the TV program have, gradually but
steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral
change and progress.”101 Collectively, these works might fall under the heading
“culture,” one of the most contested terms in academe.102 For present purposes,
the word will be used in a fairly loose sense: those patterns or symbols of human
activity that communicate information within and about a society, as well as its
shared values and norms, transmitted by any number of institutions, giving
meaning to both material and non-material aspects of that society. So defined,
culture embraces language, traditional artwork, religion, education, science, and all
sorts of mass media, including books, magazines, newspapers, television, movies,
music, and materials on the internet. This broader understanding is consistent with
technological advance in society, given that we may be engaged in “a second
Gutenberg shift,” from “literacy to visuality.”103
Most of these cultural forms can be seen as a means of storytelling. In
contrast to the analytical approach that often dominates legal and social science
argument, ordinary human beings tend to communicate and gain understanding of
life through stories, which either comport with or violate their notions of justice.104
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eds., 2005); LAW’S MOVING IMAGE (Leslie J. Moran et al. eds., 2004).
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Of course, storytelling pervades the entire legal process. Factual determinations begin with
clients and witnesses relating stories to lawyers, who retell these narratives to other lawyers,
opposing counsel and judges, as well as lay citizens sitting as jurors. But “attorneys and judges do
not like being complimented as great storytellers. They work hard to make their law stories as
unstorylike as possible, even anti-storylike: factual, logically self-evident, hostile to the fanciful,
respectful to the ordinary, seemingly ‘untailored.’” BRUNER, supra note 89, at 48. Indeed, “[t]he
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Such narrative often provides meaning and structure to real-world objects and
events, even marking their existence within reality. As psychologist Jerome
Bruner notes,
it is the sense of things often derived from narrative that makes later reallife reference possible. Indeed, we refer to events and things and people
by expressions that situate them not just in an indifferent world but in a
narrative one: “heroes” to whom we give medals for “valor,” “broken
contracts” where one party has failed to show “good-faith effort,” and the
like. Heroes and broken contracts can be referred to only by virtue of
their prior existence in a narrative world.105
Literary and cultural works may also kindle the imagination, allowing the
audience to see what cannot be seen in the real world.106 Fiction can convey that
which is otherwise too complex, fragmented, or obscure, using words and pictures
to depict the issues at stake and the human interests implicated by the criminal
process. Millions of Americans are caught up in the criminal justice system in one
way or another.107 Every day, an enormous number of individuals are implicated
in police investigations; many will be forced into a bewildering criminal process of
hearings, motions, briefs, oral arguments, and so on; and a significant proportion
end up in government custody in jails and prisons. It can be a nightmarish
experience for a defendant (or victim), dragged through a long, virtually
incomprehensible, sometimes hidden process controlled by massive bureaucracies
and their innumerable agents, culminating in the imposition of sometimes
exemplary punishment, extinguishing liberty and even life itself. The context is
still modern America, the background providing an air of familiarity. But this is
not the idealized image of criminal justice; instead, it is a surreal process of
seemingly arbitrary judgments that are hard to capture with doctrine and data.
A literary representation of the criminal process may allow the reader to
appreciate the confusion felt by suspects, defendants, victims, and family
members, as well as the apparently capricious nature of life-altering decisions.
“desperate attempt to derive purpose from purposelessness will often distort reality.” Alan M.
Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 79, at 100.
105
BRUNER, supra note 89, at 8.
106
Literature “creates the world to which we turn incessantly and without knowing it,”
Wallace Stevens once wrote, giving “to life the supreme fictions without which we are unable to
conceive of it.” Wallace Stevens, The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words, in MODERNISM: AN
ANTHOLOGY 644 (Lawrence Rainey ed., 2005).
107
See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005,
at 1 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (noting that 43.5 million
persons or 19% of U.S. residents age sixteen or older had face-to-face contact with law enforcement
in 2005);
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 50, at tbl. 4.1.2006, available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t412006.pdf (providing data on the more than fourteen
million arrests in the U.S. in 2006); supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Along these lines, Kafka’s writings often provide evocative metaphors for the
nature of criminal justice, where legal outsiders remain ignorant to the law’s
substance and procedure. In The Trial, Kafka tells the story of Josef K., who,
“without having done anything truly wrong, was arrested.”108 The protagonist is
subjected to a perplexing process, administered by a string of petty officials and
culminating in Josef K.’s execution—all without his ever understanding the law or
the charges against him. Although scholars have proposed far deeper, more
esoteric interpretations of the text,109 The Trial provides the average reader a
striking analogy to the arbitrary, cumbersome, unfeeling character of criminal
justice today, where preexisting images of a logical and fair process conflict with
the otherworldly experiences of those whose actual interests are at stake. In fact,
judicial opinions have referenced Kafka to describe those cases and doctrines that
seem utterly absurd or render the law incomprehensible to lay participants.110 “The
Trial is actually closer to reality than fantasy as far as the client’s perception of the
system,” Justice Anthony Kennedy once noted. “It’s supposed to be fantastic
allegory, but it’s reality.”111
There is, in fact, a vast body of literary and cultural works that may convey
difficult legal concepts or multifaceted phenomenon in a fashion understandable to
the average citizen. Shirley Jackson’s unsettling short story, The Lottery, presents
a powerful metaphor for the arbitrary nature of punishment and, in particular, the
death penalty in America, bringing home what Justice Potter Stewart described as
the lightning-strike quality of capital punishment.112 In the cinematic realm,
Steven Soderbergh’s Academy Award-winning film, Traffic, examined drug
distribution, use, and abuse from a systemic perspective, offering a broader
understanding of the issues while also presenting a more fully rounded and vivid
portrayal of the characters, costs, and consequences of drug prohibition. These
works and many others provide opposing images to the prevailing ideology of
criminal justice as fair and rational, perhaps shaking the audience of its
complacency. “Counterstories,” as Richard Delgado has called them,
enrich imagination and teach that by combining elements from the story
and current reality, we may construct a new world richer than either
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alone. Counterstories can quicken and engage conscience. Their graphic
quality can stir imagination in ways in which more conventional
discourse cannot. . . . [But] counterstories can serve an equally important
destructive function. They can show that what we believe is ridiculous,
self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of
unjustified exclusion. They can help us understand when it is time to
reallocate power. . . . [Counterstories] invite the reader to suspend
judgment, listen for their point or message, and then decide what
measure of truth they contain.113
Still, one might wonder whether works of fiction can actually change criminal
justice policy today. For example, Traffic seemed to resonate with government
officials and the general public114—receiving rave reviews and numerous awards,
including four Oscars—yet the movie had no apparent impact on the so-called war
on drugs, which remains in effect to this day. Throughout American history,
however, there have been literary and cultural pieces that influenced public policy
by stimulating debate and priming the mechanisms of change. Perhaps the leading
critic of the law and literature movement, Richard Posner, readily conceded that
fictional works can have substantial political consequences. “Upton Sinclair’s
novel The Jungle led to federal regulation of food processing,” Posner notes, “and
who doubts the effect of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) on the abolitionist cause?”115
The same might be said of John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, which provoked
argument about the consequences of the Dust Bowl and the plight of migrant
workers.116
Another poignant example stems from America’s figurative witch-hunts for
purported communists. During the early to mid-twentieth century, the courts
largely refused to inquire into the factual basis of the alleged threat posed by
communism—the probability and immediacy of any real danger to the U.S. sociopolitical order117—with now-infamous repercussions: abusive investigations,
dubious prosecutions, and, most notorious of all, the demagoguery of Sen. Joseph
McCarthy and his congressional colleagues. Those who failed to fully cooperate
or invoked their constitutional rights were labeled “Fifth Amendment
communists,”118 with some people suffering devastating consequences to their
113
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professional and personal lives.119 As fear and finger-pointing overtook the nation,
playwright Arthur Miller was reminded of a topic he had studied as a student,
America’s first (and quite literal) witch hunt: “McCarthy [was] actually saying
certain lines that I recall the witch-hunters saying in Salem. So I started to go
back, not with the idea of writing a play, but to refresh my own mind because it
was getting eerie.”120
In The Crucible, Miller explored the seventeenth-century moral panic that
overtook a small colonial town, resulting in scores of arrests, bogus trials for
witchcraft, and some twenty executions. The theatrical production served as a
powerful metaphor for the public dread of communist infiltration and associated
government abuses occurring in mid-twentieth century America. “In both [eras],
to keep social unity intact, the authority of leaders had to be hardened and words of
skepticism toward them constricted,” Miller noted. “A new cautionary diction, an
uncustomary prudence inflected our way of talking to one another.”121 Although
the play initially fell flat, it eventually received critical acclaim, including a Tony
Award in 1953, as well as appreciation for providing a rival narrative to the anticommunist anxieties and government fear-mongering then raging in the United
States.122
Through his play, Miller sought “to make life real again, palpable and
structured,” in the belief that “a work of art might illuminate the tragic absurdities
of an anterior work of art that was called reality, but was not.”123 Some might
question the play’s immediate impact on the public’s imagination and its response
to political demagoguery, particularly given that Miller was subsequently hauled
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and held in contempt of
Congress for refusing to name names.124 Nonetheless, The Crucible was the most
significant literary challenge to McCarthyism and is probably the best known
cultural artifact of the era. It has become a stage classic performed around the
globe, providing an influential narrative on the repressive consequences of
unchecked fear and irrationality.125 “I can almost tell what the political situation in
a country is when the play is suddenly a hit there,” Miller wrote in his 1987
memoir, “it is either a warning of tyranny on the way or a reminder of tyranny just
past.”126
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C. Dystopia, Real and Fictional
As suggested, fictional works may gain force through their connection to
historical fact. But the public imagination can also be stirred by depictions of
altered or future worlds. For centuries, authors have constructed fictional societies
not only to entertain readers but to provide a foil by which to evaluate the social
order in which they live. Sixteenth-century writer and English statesman Thomas
More crafted the term “utopia” in a book by the same name, where his lead
character travels to an imaginary island-nation that has achieved the ideal polity.127
A negative image exists as well, that of “dystopia.” Apparently coined by
nineteenth-century philosopher John Stuart Mill in a parliamentary speech,
dystopia has been used to describe an imaginary society that is the antithesis of
utopia.128 Such places are marked by fear and oppression, with individuals leading
a miserable, dehumanized existence.
Ironically, fictional dystopias sometimes develop from the pursuit of a utopian
society and its underlying ideological goals—the elimination of poverty and
disease, the achievement of socio-economic equality, the promise of technological
advancement, and so on. Dystopias may also emerge from periods of war,
revolution, or some other form of mass chaos or perceived exigency, where the
people become willing to relinquish much, including basic liberty, in exchange for
security. Under either scenario and regardless of any egalitarian claims to the
contrary, the ensuing social arrangements tend to be hierarchical with strict class
divisions akin to a caste system. The type of government that rules this new order
is the defining feature of modern dystopian fiction: a totalitarian dictatorship that
sustains its power through widespread fear of a state police force and justice
system, usually coupled with propaganda reiterating the righteousness of the
regime’s judgment and inspiring hatred of dissenters, non-conformists, the
presumably lawless lower classes, and all other “outsiders.”
In contemporary dystopian works, the government obtains conformity and
fear of state agents by, among other things, stripping the populace of its privacy.
Individuals are under constant surveillance, at times through technology that
penetrates personal spaces to reveal otherwise secret thoughts and actions. As
such, everything becomes public in a dystopian world. The state’s enforcement
apparatus is rationalized by fear-mongering propaganda, with nightmarish trials
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and cruel punishment inflicted upon those who defy the regime. In dystopian
fiction, society is marked not by sporadic miscarriages of justice but instead
continuous, systematic injustice.129
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four offers the classic portrayal of
totalitarianism in the fictional state of Oceania. The inhabitants are bombarded by
propaganda encouraging them to fear and hate enemy-outsiders and to give their
unconditional loyalty to the regime, epitomized by Big Brother, the Party’s everpresent leader.130 Objective truth has ceased to exist in Oceania, where facts are
revised to serve the Party’s goals and the populace is indoctrinated to accept even
the patently false. To ensure their submission, common citizens are subjected to
relentless surveillance, with hidden microphones planted around the city and twoway televisions monitoring individuals in their own homes. Recognizing the
regime’s perpetual lies, protagonist Winston Smith engages in petty rebellions—
maintaining subversive thoughts, keeping a diary, and having a covert affair with a
younger woman. Eventually, he is led to believe that a party insider, O’Brien, is a
member of the Brotherhood, a shadowy group seeking to overthrow the Party. It is
all a ruse, however, leading to the protagonist’s arrest and imprisonment by the
regime’s Thought Police, his brutal torture and brainwashing at the hands of
O’Brien, and ultimately, Winston’s betrayal of the woman he loved and his own
conscience.
The book is thematically rich, exploring state control of information,
language, and even history to redefine the “truth”; the use of human and
technological surveillance to extinguish personal privacy; and the psychological
and physical manipulation of a population to maintain subservience.131 All of
these connect to an overarching theme, the danger of totalitarianism, which had
dominated Orwell’s writing since his involvement in the Spanish Civil War.132 As
129
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non-advanced forms. See, e.g., GEORGE ORWELL, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the
English Genius, in 2 COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL: MY
COUNTRY RIGHT OR LEFT, 1940-1943, at 56 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 2000); GEORGE
ORWELL, Review, in 3 COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL: AS I
PLEASE, 1943-1945, at 117 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 2000). Some have argued, however,
that Orwell would support capitalism if he had been alive to see its development. See Norman
Podhoretz, If Orwell Were Alive Today, in THE NORMAN PODHORETZ READER 215 (Thomas L. Jeffers
ed., 2004).
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a political matter, Nineteen Eighty-Four offers a chilling portrait of totalitarianism
taken to its logical extremes.133 Even skeptics of the law-literature enterprise, such
as Richard Epstein, acknowledge that works like Nineteen Eighty-Four have “a
certain working advantage over a quantitative social science” in the perspective it
offers on how a totalitarian regime is able to acquire so much authority to begin
with.134 Dystopian literature provides insights into the rise and persistence of such
states—how average individuals can be subdued by an erroneous perception of
safety, how tyrants are able to elicit obedience from entire populations of
previously autonomous, free-thinking citizens, and how a regime’s machinery of
fear and control can be maintained over long periods of time.135
Although Nineteen Eighty-Four has had a singular impact on the American
psyche,136 other works within the genre have explored similar themes of
totalitarianism.137 No one is ever acquitted in a fictional dystopia, its criminal
process lacking the characteristics of a just system, and yet the regimes are not
necessarily “lawless.” Rather than being subject to summary execution, the lead
characters are often tried and sentenced before an adjudicative body with the
trappings of legality.138 The criminal process becomes a means to demonstrate the
rationality and legitimacy of the regime’s justice machinery, while simultaneously
vilifying the defendant (and all other enemies of the state) and terrorizing the
masses into docile obedience out of fear that they will be next.139
But compelling dystopian fiction does more than depict a dreadful society and
the horror generated by totalitarian government. It creates an eerie sense of
familiarity for the reader, who is able to perceive social patterns in real life
extrapolated to terrifying ends in a dystopian world. The work may resonate with
the events of contemporary society and the reader’s own experience, and echo of
other places well known to the audience. Accounts of life in Nazi Germany often
133

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Orwell Versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and
Satire, 24 PHIL. & LIT. 1, 18 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Orwell Versus Huxley].
134
Richard A. Epstein, Does Literature Work as Social Science?: The Case of George Orwell,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2002).
135
See id. at 1004–05.
136
See, e.g., Introduction, in ON NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: ORWELL AND OUR FUTURE, supra
note 6, at 3; David Brin, The Self-Preventing Prophecy; or, How a Dose of Nightmare Can Help
Tame Tomorrow’s Perils, in ON NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: ORWELL AND OUR FUTURE, supra note 6, at
224.
137
See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); YEVGENY ZAMYATIN, WE
(Gregory Zilbourg trans., 1921). See also MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1986); RAY
BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953); ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); ARTHUR
KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy ed., 1941); AYN RAND, ANTHEM (1938); KURT
VONNEGUT, PLAYER PIANO (1952).
138
See, e.g., GOTTLIEB, supra note 129, at 35.
139
See id. (“societies can be characterized as dystopic when the prime function of the law is to
define lawlessness and to segregate those inside the magic circle, who are to be placed under the law,
from those who are thrust outside as enemies, demons, scapegoats”).
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describe a dystopian world as awful as any fictional society. Likewise, one cannot
read Orwell without imagining the post-World War II environment, especially the
rise of police states around the globe. In fact, the stark contrast between the
discourse of totalitarian rulers and the narratives of those they ruled illuminates the
relative nature of utopia and dystopia. While the party leadership might well have
described Soviet life as a communist utopia, the existence of the dissident was
surely dystopian.
For political theorists like Hannah Arendt, the totalitarianism of Hitler’s
Germany and Stalin’s Russia represented a new, radical form of dictatorial
authority that sought “the permanent domination of each single individual in each
and every sphere of life.”140 As in fiction, real-world totalitarian regimes have
arisen in times of political strife and socio-economic crisis, drawing strength from
a negative solidarity among the populace and professing a comprehensive
perfectionist ideology. They often acquire and consolidate power through an
oppressive police force that seeks out and destroys the alleged enemies of the state
via a network of informants, unrestricted searches and seizures, heavy-handed
interrogation techniques, and prolonged detention in brutal conditions. When
necessary, official propaganda can describe such action as essential to counter the
allegedly devious nature and evil plans of the regime’s enemies, thereby justifying
a relentless war against them.
Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski described totalitarianism as a
“syndrome” of interrelated characteristics, such as control of the media and
maintenance of a secret police force.141 Others scholars have been even more
explicit about the psychological aspect of totalitarianism, an “authoritarian
personality” of sorts, which includes:
exaggerated concern with power; obedience and respect for authorities;
disregard for and a proclivity to exploit and manipulate others . . . ; a
high level of conventionality, and, at the same time, a lack of
individuality; an inclination to self-righteousness and moral indignation;
bigotry; a tendency to condemn minorities and other marginal groups;
magnified moral concern with sex; intolerance; thinking in rigid
categories of “black and white”; a tendency to use stereotypes; persistent
superstitiousness, and hostility towards “others” (as opposite to “us”).142

140

HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 326 (1973) (1951). See also
LEONARD SCHAPIRO, TOTALITARIANISM (1972); CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI,
TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1956); FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE
AUTHORITARIAN STATE (1957). See generally PAUL BROOKER, NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORY,
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (2000).
141
FRIEDRICH & BRZEZINSKI, supra note 140, at 22.
142
Adam Podgorecki, Totalitarian Law: Basic Concepts and Issues, in TOTALITARIAN AND
POST-TOTALITARIAN LAW 3 (Adam Podgorecki & Vittorio Olgiati eds., 1996).
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This mentality co-opts the legal system for its own purposes. For a dictator, law
has instrumental value by pronouncing norms of coherence and integrity that
coexist with, but never trump, a shadow system serving the caprice of authority.
This secret law is ubiquitous and peremptory in totalitarian governance,
confronting the people at all times and reminding them that law is merely a
coercive tool of the regime.143
Nowhere is this more evident than in the criminal process of a totalitarian
state. In 1991, Professor Radzinowicz—a former Polish refugee who had
witnessed the rise of oppressive penal policies a half-century earlier144—described
the aspects of an authoritarian model of criminal justice typified by the worst
dictatorships in modern times. In such systems, crimes are ill-defined and
consistently added to the penal code; police ignore legal constraints, lack
meaningful accountability, and exercise de facto adjudicative powers on the
streets; suspects are subjected to physical and mental coercion to extract
information, and offenders are viewed as malevolent outsiders to be subjugated or
extinguished; the criminal process is opaque, and the rules of evidence and
procedure are ignored or paid lip-service; punishment is harsh, and prisoner rights
are non-existent; and appellate review is cursory at best.145 Radzinowicz pointed to
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia as practicing “the most perfect (and cruel)
examples” of this model.146
Whether it was the elimination of citizen
individuality, the application of grotesque stereotypes, or the destruction of the rule
of law, both regimes used criminal justice as a means to achieve hegemonic control
over the populace.
But Radzinowicz went further, suggesting that many of the above indicators
apply to contemporary nations, including the United States. Although it would be
“grossly misguided and unfair” to describe the U.S. approach as an archetype of
authoritarianism, he did “not hesitate to affirm that the American system belongs
to the lowest category among the democratic countries of the world.”147 The point
may be well taken, given that several of the above elements can be identified
within the U.S. criminal justice system, including:
•

143

an exponential growth in criminal liability and punishment through,
inter alia, the creation of broadly defined offenses, the use of
liability-expanding doctrines, and the enactment of determinate

See id. at 14.
See LEON RADZINOWICZ, ADVENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY (1999).
145
Leon Radzinowicz, Penal Regressions, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 425–27 (1991).
146
Intensive studies corroborate the dystopic characteristics of these two dictatorships. See,
e.g., INGA MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991); PETER H. SOLOMON
JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN (1996).
147
Radzinowicz, supra note 145, at 439.
144
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sentencing schemes and harsh mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment;148
deficient police accountability and the existence of a secret law on
the streets, evidenced by high-profile cases and reports of mental
and physical coercion of suspects, acts of police violence and even
torture, racial discrimination in the investigation of crime, and
various other forms of officer misconduct;149
the exemption of certain categories of crime from normal legal rules
and a fervent hostility to any arguments challenging the underlying
rationale for special treatment, epitomized by the de facto “drug
exception” to constitutional criminal procedure and the rejection of
evidence that, for instance, supports the availability of medical
marijuana;150 and
the demonization of offenders—as well as judges who dare to rule
in their favor—leading to attacks on judicial independence, the
effective transfer of power from courts to prosecutors, the limitation
on appellate and collateral review for defendants, and the tolerance
(if not desire) for brutal prison conditions.151

Moreover, specific subsets of U.S. society may experience a microcosmic version
of despotic rule, a sort of mini-dystopia, exemplified by the repressive policing of
lower socio-economic classes in urban America.152

148

See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005).
See also Luna, Gridland, supra, note 94.
149
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
183 (2003); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000).
150
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002).
151
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139 (2006);
James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and Sexual Terrorism
in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433 (2003); J.C. Oleson, The Punitive Coma, 90 CAL. L. REV. 829, 849–61
(2002); Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 681, 683–92
(1997).
152
For example, a community project in Los Angeles entitled “Utopia/Dystopia” sought to
examine the disparate experiences in the city’s downtown area:
One person’s utopia is another’s dystopia. In the past 40 years civic policy in Los
Angeles has generated the twin towers of utopia and dystopia: Bunker Hill, the
redeveloped high rise financial center, and below it Skid Row. The real estate boom has
generated new social policy, including the desired displacement of the majority
population of poor people living in the area. [The Los Angeles Police Department] has
engaged in a policy of constant harassment and daily arrests of people living on the
streets. All to make the area safe for development.
Los
Angeles
Poverty
Department,
UTOPIA/dystopia,
available
at
http://lapovertydept.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=31&Itemid=45 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009).
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As mentioned earlier, doctrinal analysis and criminological research may have
difficulties expressing the full consequences of state action. Standard approaches
to legal reasoning often fail to convey the human interests at stake, while the
fastidious, point-by-point approach of many lawyerly arguments and judicial
opinions may lose the bigger picture. Given the foregoing, one obvious concern is
the diminution of individual freedom and procedural protections through the steady
expansion of the criminal justice system and the authority of law enforcement.
Dystopian fiction can communicate this danger through political satire, illustrating
the potential repercussions should current trends continue without critical
examination and response.153 By prompting identification of the possibilities, a
dystopian work may inspire the audience to take steps to prevent a truly dreadful
outcome.
Recognizing this literary potential, legal scholars and even a few jurists have
referenced leading dystopian works to express the hazards of a given criminal
justice ruling or doctrine. In his dissent from the Court’s decision upholding
warrantless aerial surveillance, Justice William Brennan penned the following
conclusion:
I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police
surveillance methods they would sanction were among those described
. . . in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s: “The blackmustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner. There
was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS
WATCHING YOU, the caption said . . . . In the far distance a helicopter
skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a
bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police
Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.” Who can read this passage
without a shudder, and without the instinctive reaction that it depicts life
in some country other than ours?154
Although brief, this reference has power because America’s cultural framework
has fully incorporated Nineteen Eighty-Four, with the work carrying a widely
understood symbolic meaning when applied to government action. The mental
picture of the police conduct in question becomes more lucid and intense, allowing
the audience to imagine the potential consequences and contemplate whether the
law should, in fact, prohibit such intrusions on privacy.155

153

Posner, Orwell Versus Huxley, supra note 133, at 8 (“Extrapolation is the key. The satirist
criticizes repulsive tendencies in his or her society by providing an imaginative picture of the logical
outcome of those tendencies.”).
154
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949)).
155
See M. Todd Henderson, Citing Fiction, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 171 (2008). In his article,
Henderson concluded that meaningful literary references are not a common occurrence. Such
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Many will doubt that a truly dystopian society could ever emerge in the
United States, given the relatively fleeting nature of modern totalitarian
dictatorships, the American aversion to governmental abuses and even petty
tyrannies, and the existence of thousands upon thousands of government
officials—law enforcement agents, prosecutors, judges, and many others—who
work tirelessly for the public welfare. With that said, there are good reasons for
circumspection. “History is a long and dreary litany of ruinous decisions made by
rulers in all centuries and on all continents,” notes scientist and author David Brin
in his discussion of dystopian fiction’s real-world benefits. “A common thread
weaves through most of these disasters; a flaw in human character—selfdeception—eventually enticed even great leaders into taking fatal missteps,
ignoring the warnings of others.”156 Comparisons to dystopias of literature and
history can offer warnings about disturbing trends in criminal justice and the
systemic structures that generate such problems, which may impact the public
imagination.
In this important sense, literary dystopias contain prognostications for the
future, drawing the audience’s attention to past incidents and present day
experience. The year before his death, Chief Justice William Rehnquist penned a
short review of Nineteen Eighty-Four, noting that “[p]erhaps Orwell’s widely read
book itself helped to discourage any possible effort by a government to curb
[basic] freedoms.”157 He acknowledged that the danger of totalitarianism in the
Western world is far less likely today than when the dystopian work was released
in 1949. Elsewhere, however, the threat remains quite real, confronting
individuals on a regular basis. “The book stands as a warning against letting
liberal democracy slip away or be extinguished where it already exists and as a
testament to the meager lives of those who presently live under such a regime,”
Rehnquist concluded.158
Dystopian fiction may be especially apt today, given America’s recent
experiences and the social and legal changes that have ensued. Like the state of
war depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the current “war on terror” is continuous
and has no foreseeable end, with the enemy changing over time, from terrorist
organizations to entire nations. Nonetheless, with a dichotomous worldview of usversus-them, the American government effectively adopted the Orwellian position
that the “enemy of the moment always represent[s] absolute evil.”159 Officials
citations occurred in about 1 out of every 10,000 federal appellate decisions; they are often found in
separate opinions and employed by the same group of jurists; and they are primarily referenced for
concepts in the judge’s own world, “not the world of the criminal, the marginalized, or the less
fortunate.” Id. at 177.
156
Brin, supra note 136, at 224.
157
William H. Rehnquist, Orwell: 1984, 102 MICH. L. REV. 981, 986 (2004). See also Brin,
supra note 136, at 222–23, 230.
158
Rehnquist, Orwell, supra note 157, at 987. But cf. infra note 320 and accompanying text.
159
ORWELL, supra note 130, at 32.
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sometimes speak in a type of Newspeak,160 where civilian deaths are referred to as
“collateral” and a privacy-reducing law is labeled a “Patriot Act.”161 The U.S.
military even opened an “Office of Strategic Influence” designed to sway public
opinion and policymakers, possibly through the dissemination of false
information.162 The operation is reminiscent of Oceania’s Ministry of Truth and
the Party slogan, “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the
present controls the past.”163 Of special concern here and discussed below is the
adoption of long-abandoned practices—such as imprisonment without judicial
recourse and the use of torture to extract confessions and other information—often
with the support of self-styled progressives and in a social environment that stirs
only fear and rage.164
IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE WAR ON TERROR
The events of September 11, 2001 scarcely need repeating: A small band of
Al Qaeda operatives used hijacked airplanes as ballistic weapons against American
targets, killing nearly three thousand people and shocking the entire world. In
response, the U.S. military invaded Afghanistan and Iraq with, to date, mixed
results. Most relevant for present purposes, the federal government engaged in
activities that seem to fit within the authoritarian model of criminal justice,
including the following:
•

In the immediate wake of 9/11, law enforcement interviewed
thousands of Middle-Eastern men now residing in the United States,
some of whom were detained on the pretext of immigration
violations, in a type of mass roundup that smacked of racial
profiling. Although subsequent guidelines issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice generally prohibit this type of profiling, the
rules specifically stated that agents “protecting national security or

160
See id. at 53 (“Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of
thought?”); id. at 303 (“The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression
for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of
thought impossible.”).
161
See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., David E. Kaplan, How Rocket Scientists Got Into the Hearts-and-Minds Game,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 17, 2005, at 30, 31; James Dao & Eric Schmitt, Pentagon
Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at A1.
163
ORWELL, supra note 130, at 37. See also id. at 215 (“the essential act of the Party is to use
conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty”); id. at
217 (“The Ministry of Peace concerns itself with war, the Ministry of Truth with lies, the Ministry of
Love with torture, and the Ministry of Plenty with starvation.”).
164
See id. at 220.
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preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport security screeners)
may consider race, ethnicity, and other relevant factors.”165
Those accused of immigration violations (as well as a few held on
so-called “material witness” warrants) were detained for months on
end, without trial or even access to legal counsel and their families.
Some claimed to have been placed in unusual conditions (e.g.,
extended solitary confinement) and abused physically and verbally
(e.g., guards beating a detainee and calling him a “Muslim
killer”).166 Other detainees have been subject to “extraordinary
rendition” and similar schemes, where they were either handed over
or taken by American officials to foreign jurisdictions that allow
cruel conditions of confinement, systematic prisoner abuses, and
even torture.167
Alleged terrorists were placed in military detention at the U.S.
Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as well as a few other
military facilities and a network of secret prisons maintained by the
Central Intelligence Agency.168 The extended, incommunicado
internment in a modern-day penal colony was rationalized by
exploiting imprecise but critical legal terms, such as the concept of
“unlawful combatants.” Most detainees went uncharged in any sort
of legal tribunal, while a few faced trial before a military
commission in a process entirely controlled by the executive branch
and utilizing looser rules of evidence and procedure than employed
in regular criminal courts. Worse yet, it appears that innocent
individuals may have been detained at Guantánamo based on
unsubstantiated allegations.169

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement
Agencies, June 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guidance_on_race.php.
See generally David A. Harris, New Risks, New Tactics: An Assessment of the Re-Assessment of
Racial Profiling in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 913. Cf. Liz Robbins, 9
Muslims Are Pulled From Plane and Denied Re-Entry; Airline Apologizes Next Day, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2009, at A9.
166
See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF
ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER
11 ATTACKS (2003) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm.
167
See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); El-Masri v. United States, 479
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Jane Perlez et al., Ex-Detainee of the U.S. Describes a 6-Year Ordeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at A1; Ian Fisher, Testimony Is Said to Implicate C.I.A. in Seizure of Suspect in
Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at A5.
168
See WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 43–54 (2007)
(providing relevant legislation and executive orders, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
and the Military Commission Act of 2006).
169
See, e.g., William Glaberson, Rulings of Improper Detentions in Cuba as the Bush Era
Closes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A1.
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The Bush Administration approved “enhanced interrogation
techniques”—extremely harsh, if not torturous, methods to extract
information from terrorism suspects—relying upon legal memos
that opined such actions would not violate domestic and
international law or could at least be justified under exigent
circumstances.170
Some methods sound banal—for instance,
employing temperature extremes, sleep deprivation, and stress
positions—but can result in severe physical and psychological
trauma.171 One much-discussed technique, known as “waterboarding,” involves pouring water over the face of an immobilized
detainee, instigating a gag reflex and making the individual believe
that he is drowning and on the verge of death. A recently released
report documented other troubling practices, such as applying
pressure to a detainee’s carotid artery until he passed out,
threatening to use a handgun and power drill, staging mock
executions, and suggesting that a detainee’s family members were
about to be sexually assaulted.172 All told, scores of individuals
have died in C.I.A. or military detention abroad.173
The federal government implemented new or enhanced surveillance
programs that implicate personal privacy and basic legal constraints,
such as the Fourth Amendment. For instance, agents may obtain
information from electronic communications providers about their
subscribers without meeting the traditional standard of probable

170
See, e.g., A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html.
In the words of journalist
Anthony Lewis, “the memos read like the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the
law and stay out of prison.” Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004
at 4.
171
See, e.g., Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 9,
2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22530 (reviewing International Committee of the
Red Cross report on treatment of C.I.A. detainees). See also Andrew Sullivan, Dear President Bush,
THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2009, at 78–88, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200910/bushtorture.
172
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES, (SEPTEMBER 2001-OCTOBER 2003)
49,
75–76
(2004)
(released
Aug.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20090825-DETAIN/2004CIAIG.pdf;
Mark
Mazzetti & Scott Shane, C.I.A. Abuse Cases Detailed in Report on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2009, at A1.
173
See, e.g., From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers
and Administration Interrogation Rules (Part II): Hearing on Interrogation Techniques Before H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110TH
CONG. 24 (2008) (statement of Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to former Secretary of
State Colin Powell).
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cause.174 In addition, a scheme known as the “Terrorist Surveillance
Program” empowered the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) to
intercept phone calls where one party is outside of the United States
and it is believed that one of the parties is somehow connected to Al
Qaeda.175 In 2008, questions were raised as to whether the N.S.A.
illegally wiretapped a Muslim scholar residing in the U.S. and failed
to reveal this information at his trial, which culminated in a life
sentence.176 The newest allegations are far broader, however,
concerning the N.S.A.’s unauthorized surveillance of private phone
calls and e-mail, including the “overcollection” of possibly millions
of individual communications.177
Nearly every aspect of America’s anti-terrorism efforts has been
shrouded in secrecy and only partially revealed by civil rights suits,
for instance, or requests under the Freedom of Information Act, with
the Justice Department often asserting the so-called “state secrets
privilege” to defeat such actions.178 Most recently, there have been
revelations of undisclosed counterterrorism and surveillance
programs, claims that the head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s
clandestine service ordered the destruction of videotapes of
enhanced interrogations, and allegations that government officials
impeded investigations into mass P.O.W. killings by America’s
Afghani allies.179 Other problematic ideas never came to fruition
(e.g., using military forces to conduct domestic searches and

See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, §215, 115
Stat. 272, 287–88.
175
Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
176
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Panel to Call for N.S.A. Investigation Into
Wiretapping of Muslim Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at A22.
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See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Extent of E-Mail Surveillance Renews Concerns in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A4; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S.
Wiretaps Exceeded Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A1.
178
See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (denying discovery on
extraordinary rendition program based on state secrets privilege); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the “specifics remain undisclosed” about
the Terrorist Surveillance Program); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying request for information about detainees). See generally United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (seminal Supreme Court decision on privilege).
179
See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A16; James Risen, U.S. Inaction Seen After Taliban P.O.W.’s Died, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2009, at A1; Scott Shane, Cheney Is Linked to Concealment of C.I.A. Project, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2009, at A1. See also Scott Shane, A New Push to Look Back: Bush-Era Issues May
Force Obama’s Hand, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at A1.
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seizures) or were unsuccessful (e.g., C.I.A. outsourcing of
assassinations to private contractors).180
Government officials sometimes employed sweeping definitions of
“terrorism” in classifying cases.181 If prosecutors decide to bring
charges, they have at their disposal a number of substantive
offenses—such as conspiracy and “material support” of terrorism—
that raise concern of due process, freedom of speech, associational
rights, and the like, due to their open-ended, inchoate nature.182
Civil liberties groups have decried the broad sweep of these crimes
and their application in particular cases, with some defense
attorneys claiming their clients have entered into plea bargains
under threat of being labeled an “enemy combatant,” which would
render them persona non grata in the ordinary criminal process.183

Through such actions, officials have sought and, to a degree, achieved a type
of terror exception to established procedures and constitutional standards.184 The
policies and practices have been rationalized by claims of government necessity
and often accepted at face value by a fearful citizenry. For example, not only was
the public ignorant as to the specifics and consequences of the Patriot Act, but
there was little congressional debate before its passage.185 “Despite my
misgivings, I acquiesced in some of the administration’s proposals,” Senator
Patrick Leahy conceded, “because it is important to preserve national unity in this
time of national crisis and to move the legislative process forward.”186 In general,
the American public accepted much of the expansion in government powers
through its subsequent submission to a “fortress mentality.”187 Few would have
180
See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & David Johnston, Bush Weighed Using Military in U.S. Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A1; Mark Mazzetti, Outsiders Hired As C.I.A. Planned to Kill
Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2009, at A1.
181
See, e.g., Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Alternative Federal Definitions of
Terrorism
Criminal
Cases,
available
at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215/include/definitions.html#critical_infrastructure.
182
See, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with
Fundamentalism, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005). See generally MCCORMACK, supra note 168.
183
See, e.g., MCCORMACK, supra note 168, at 139.
184
The alleged legal basis and potential breadth of post-9/11 presidential power is outlined in a
series of memoranda issued by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. See, e.g., Neil A.
Lewis, Memos Reveal Scope of Power Bush Sought in Fighting Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at
A1. The documents are now available at http://documents.nytimes.com/bush-administrationterrorism-memos#p=1.
185
See, e.g., Sharon H. Rackow, How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental
Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of “Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1651, 1694–96 (2002).
186
147 Cong. Rec. 19, 493 (2001) (statement by Sen. Leahy).
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thought this possible before 9/11, and today levelheaded analysis raises doubts as
to the basis for the government’s extraordinary actions. The calculations should be
checked, with a fresh assessment of costs and benefits.188
A. Rethinking the War on Terror
Let’s reconsider some of the foundational aspects of the war on terror,
beginning with the definition of terrorist. This infamous designation gets thrown
around quite a bit, but exactly what makes an individual a “terrorist” rather than,
say, a perfectly respectable “revolutionary” or “freedom fighter”? Is it the severity
of his acts, such as the infliction of massive, indiscriminate harm on people and
property? Or is it the targeting of innocent civilians in their homes and public
spaces to achieve some political end? One federal statute defines terrorism as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”189 Osama bin Laden easily
qualifies as a terrorist under this formulation, but Timothy McVeigh might not.
After all, McVeigh was neither a clandestine agent nor a member of a subnational
group.
Another approach might focus on a trio of common criteria: “the terrorist
appears in civilian clothing, attacks civilian targets, and blends back into civilian
populations.”190 Oddly, this could make a serial killer like Ted Bundy or John
Allen Muhammad a terrorist, but might exclude a fatigue-clad member of FARC191
or a Klansman draped in a white sheet. Still another basic feature of terrorism is
the ongoing nature of violence against civilians.192 But if some individual (or
group) commits only a single act of politically motivated violence against civilians,
no matter how horrific, is he not a terrorist? For better or worse, an affirmative
response would seem to convert terrorism into a recidivist concept.193
In addition, what is one to make of mass violence against civilians that would
be deemed terrorism if committed by private actors but instead is the work of
government agents or others who act under color of law? Consider, for instance,

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 277 (2007). But cf. N.R. Kleinfield, A
Fortress City That Didn’t Come to Be: Fears of 9/12 Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at A1.
188
David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Signals His Reluctance to Investigate Bush
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at A1 (quoting Elisa Massimino, executive director of Human
Rights First).
189
22 U.S.C. § 2656(f)(d)(2).
190
MCCORMACK, supra note 168, at 8.
191
FARC is the Spanish-language acronym for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia,
which has been designated by the U.S. State Department as a foreign terrorist organization.
192
MCCORMACK, supra note 168, at 29.
193
There are also various psychological or cultural frameworks for understanding terrorists,
but these seem more like diagnostic criteria than workable elements of a legal definition. See, e.g.,
id. at 29–32.
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the historical exploits of various American officials, from Andrew Jackson’s
virtually genocidal relocation of Native Americans on the “trail of tears” and
William Tecumseh Sherman’s scorched-earth practices during his “march to the
sea,” to the fire-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo and the nuclear destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.194 A truly brutish approach might look to who prevailed
in the underlying conflict or ask whether a given action had the pretense of
legality. This is only acceptable if someone adopts a might-makes-right approach
or some sort of Nixonian understanding of executive power.195 History records
horrifying acts against civilians that were “lawful” in some sense, backed by a
given population and grounded in a legal text (e.g., anti-Semitic violence based on
the Nuremberg Laws). But the cloak of authority does not seem to diminish the
moral culpability of an otherwise terroristic act; if anything, the abuse of power
makes it worse, not better.
When the issue is terrorism, maybe the actors and their actions can be
differentiated through the doctrine of “double effect,” a line of reasoning that lays
out circumstances where harm to another may be justified by the greater good it
produces.196 But the analysis can be tricky, requiring a normative judgment about
the relevant action and the values that it seeks to vindicate, an assessment of the
actor’s actual intentions in light of the delicate line between purposeful ends and
foreseen consequences, and a weighing of harms and benefits, some of which may
be speculative or incommensurable. For example, historians seem to agree that
Sherman’s march facilitated the end of the Civil War, “destroy[ing] much of the
South’s potential and psychology to wage war,”197 and as a result, his tactics were
critical to maintaining the union and ensuring the ultimate demise of slavery in
America while also minimizing further bloodshed.198
But Sherman himself acknowledged that vengeance played a part,199 with
“many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence”200 committed by his troops and most
194

Cf. DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD 84
(1993) (describing violence committed against non-belligerent Native Americans).
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“[W]hen the president does it,” President Nixon told journalist David Frost, “that means
that it is not illegal.” Richard Nixon: Interview on Watergate, reprinted in THE POWER OF THE
PRESIDENCY: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSY 179 (Robert S. Hirschfield ed., 1982). See, e.g., ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 421 (2004).
196
The concept, which originated from Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of lethal self-defense in
his Summa Theologiae, has been the topic of much philosophical debate. See, e.g., Suzanne Uniacke,
Double Effect, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 120 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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DAVID J. EICHER, THE LONGEST NIGHT: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 768
(2001). See also HERMAN HATTAWAY & ARCHER JONES, HOW THE NORTH WON: A MILITARY
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR (1983).
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See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THIS MIGHTY SCOURGE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CIVIL WAR 116–
121 (2007).
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See, e.g., EICHER, supra note 197, at 768 (quoting Sherman as saying that “the whole army
is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina . . . I almost tremble at
her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her.”).
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of the harm inflicted upon the populace being “simple waste and destruction.”201
In fact, the campaign helped set a precedent for the concept of total war:
The Civil War, as practiced by the belligerents and characterized by
Sherman, implemented two propositions which later wars took much
further: that the nation and the nation’s professed ideals admit no
necessary limit in their fight to prevail; that the methods of waging war
do not differ categorically if at all between the belligerent whose cause is
labeled just and the belligerent whose cause is labeled unjust. Neither of
these propositions commands universal assent, yet modern belligerents
have acted as if they were true.202
In the end, Sherman’s tactics might still be justified by the objectives it
achieved, just as one might stomach the civilian deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
given Japan’s imperialist ambitions, the aggression and cruelty of that nation’s
military, and the estimated casualties from an American land invasion. To be
meaningful, however, such analysis demands an open mind free of hypocrisy, one
willing to hear all arguments and then judge them on the merits. If the topic of
terrorism were approached in this manner, the evaluation would seem to invite
claims by the purported terrorists themselves—or, more likely, by someone willing
to play the devil’s advocate—regarding the normative underpinnings of their acts
and the goals that were served, as well as the supposed injustices perpetuated and
damage inflicted by the United States. For some, this will be a most unpleasant
discussion, but it is one that a liberal constitutional democracy must have to ensure
that it remains precisely that: a state governed by the people and concerned for the
common good, yet always mindful of individual substantive rights, like the

200

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN 182 (William S.
McFeely ed., 1984) (1875).
201
PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS HERO AND
MYTH-MAKER FROM THE CRIMEA TO IRAQ 29 (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2004) (1975). See also
MICHAEL FELLMAN, CITIZEN SHERMAN: A LIFE OF WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN (1995). Southerners
were also terrified by the threat of sexual assault at the hands of Union soldiers, due in no small part
to U.S. General Benjamin Butler’s infamous military order that any female citizen of New Orleans
who showed contempt towards his troops “shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman
of the town plying her avocation” (i.e., a prostitute). General Orders No. 28, in 1 PRIVATE AND
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF GEN. BENJAMIN F. BUTLER DURING THE PERIOD OF THE CIVIL WAR 490
(1917), quoted in Crystal N. Feimster, General Benjamin Butler and the Threat of Sexual Violence
During the American Civil War, 138 DÆDALUS 126, 128–29 (2009). Butler maintained that the order
did not authorize rape, but according to one historian, “he clearly believed that threatening sexual
violence was a justifiable means of subduing southern women.” Feimster, supra, at 129. Moreover,
some U.S. military and political officials supported Butler’s actions, and President Lincoln never
repudiated the order. Id. at 129–30.
202
CHARLES ROYSTER, THE DESTRUCTIVE WAR: WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, STONEWALL
JACKSON, AND THE AMERICANS 358–59 (1991). See also STANNARD, supra note 194.
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freedom to be a dissenter or non-conformist, and solicitous of basic procedural
protections against invasions of privacy and deprivations of freedom.
I will leave it to others to present the grievances of alleged terrorists203 and
instead focus on the government responses to 9/11—the profiling and mass roundups, the harsh conditions of confinement and extraordinary renditions, the use of
coercive interrogation techniques and the internment of foreign suspects, the
various forms of enhanced surveillance, and so on. At a minimum, the exceptional
nature of these programs and the power they provide law enforcement call for
heavy scrutiny of their application. The definition of terrorist and terrorism proves
central to the inquiry. Terrorism scholar Wayne McCormack has articulated a
series of rationales that support conceptual clarity in this area, including: the
preclusion of arbitrary power via explicit standards; the delineation by case type of
an appropriate legal forum (domestic civilian, military, or international); the
prevention of irrational, vigilante justice in the wake of violence; and the assurance
of constitutionally authorized, commensurate responses by government.204 By
defining the terms terrorist and terrorism, at least society will have an idea of the
acts and actors subject to the state’s enhanced authority.
But as suggested above, hard definitions have been hard to come by, and quite
frankly, a universally agreed-upon formulation may be impossible. For many
decades, the world community has struggled to delineate what counts as terrorism
and who should be deemed a terrorist, with nations sometimes clashing among
themselves over particular applications, exemplified by a 2002 case where the U.S.
and Israel disagreed upon the classification of a homicidal rampage.205 Just as
troubling, however, is law enforcement’s own labeling of acts and actors and the
deployment of its new, exceptional powers. A recently released report found that
federal entities classifying cases agreed less than ten percent of the time that
203
For instance, one frequently repeated grievance is that “the United States has favored Israel
in the Arab-Israeli conflict,” creating “a widespread sense in the Islamic world that its policies are
unfair and lacking in evenhandedness.” Karima Alavi, At Risk of Prejudice: Teaching Tolerance
About Muslim Americans, 65 SOC. EDUC. 344, 346 (2001), available at
http://downloads.ncss.org/lessons/650603.pdf.
204
MCCORMACK, supra note 168, at 8–9.
205
See id. at 291.
The man officials say opened fire at a crowded El Al airlines ticket counter on Thursday
was an Egyptian-born owner of a limousine service who apparently went to the airport
heavily armed and determined to kill, managing to take two lives before Israeli security
guards shot him to death during a fierce, bloody struggle. . . . American and Israeli
officials initially appeared to disagree on Thursday about whether [the] rampage should
be called a terrorist attack. But it became clear today that the difference was really over
what constitutes terrorism. Yuval Rotem, Israel’s consul general in Los Angeles, said
that even a lone individual attacking an Israeli target like the El Al ticket counter should
be considered a terrorist. But F.B.I. officials said that only if [the assailant] was linked to
a terrorist organization would American investigators call it that, rather than a hate crime.
Rick Lyman & Nick Madigan, Officials Puzzled About Motive of Airport Gunman Who Killed 2,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2002, at A1.
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terrorism was involved in a given prosecution.206 An earlier government audit
found that all sorts of cases were being counted as terrorism prosecutions—drug
trafficking, immigration violations, even marriage fraud—irrespective of whether
the investigation was able to link the suspect or defendant to terrorist activity.207
As it turns out, federal prosecutors are spending far less time on bona fide
terrorism cases than the public has been led to believe,208 and they decline to
prosecute two-thirds of terrorism referrals brought to them by investigating
agencies, often for lack of evidence, criminal intent, or a viable federal offense.209
Nonetheless, law enforcement has been exercising its war-on-terror powers at an
increasing rate,210 with agents across the country using terrorism provisions against
seemingly common criminals.211
Such information should elicit skepticism as to whether the resources and
investigative tools provided to law enforcement were as necessary as claimed or
instead a power grab during a time of national hysteria. But even assuming we had
a clear idea of what constitutes terrorism and trusted law enforcement to abide by
this definition, another basic question remains: Does the threat justify the
exceptional powers and responses of government? Many assume that the terrorist
phenomenon is unique, but history is replete with acts that would qualify as
206

Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Who Is a Terrorist?: Government Failure to
Define Terrorism Undermines Enforcement, Puts Civil Liberties at Risk, available at
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2008, at A1.
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See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs to Swindling,
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terrorism under any of the foregoing standards or criteria.212 Nor should it be
dispositive that the current state of affairs has been denominated a “war.” Similar
declarations have been made against other problems—drugs, poverty, crime,
gangs, et cetera—and in each case, the object hardly fits the classic definition of
war.213 Instead, the war on terror, like the war on drugs, is a type of political trope
that expresses the earnestness of government actors and the significance they
attach to their efforts.
So what is the threat posed by terrorism, however defined? It has been
estimated that about fifteen thousand people have been killed in terrorist attacks
around the world over the past four decades, an average of about 380 deaths per
year. For perspective, this rate is less than the annual number of Americans who
suffocate in bed, drown in swimming pools, or are electrocuted.214 Indeed, the
number of people killed by terrorists worldwide over the past forty years is roughly
equivalent to those murdered by “ordinary” criminals in the U.S. each year. Over
a lifetime, an American is more likely to be killed by lightning or a venomous
animal, for instance, than to die in a terrorist attack.215 Around the globe, the
amount of terrorist incidents decreased after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the Western world has experienced a
significant decline in terrorism-related attacks and deaths in recent years.216
Today, there appears to be a consensus among analysts that another incident akin
to 9/11 is unlikely to occur in the United States.217 Moreover, experts and agency
heads agree that 9/11 could have and should have been detected and averted by
law enforcement.218 It is also safe to assume that the conventional wisdom about
hijackings (e.g., calmly cooperate) will not be heeded.219
212

See, e.g., THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY TO AL QAEDA (Gérard Chaliand &
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Still, what are the odds that an individual will die in a hijacking? One scholar
put it in perspective by making the threat implausibly worse and then crunching
the numbers:
[L]et us assume that each week one commercial aircraft were hijacked
and crashed. What are the odds that a person who goes on one trip per
month would be in that plane? There are currently about 18,000
commercial flights a day, and if that person’s trip has four flights
associated with it, the odds against that person’s being on a crashed plane
are about 135,000 to 1. If there were only one hijacked plane per month,
the odds would be about 540,000 to 1.220
By comparison, the odds of dying in a car crash each year is 6,500 to 1.221 What
makes the public’s lack of perspective on comparative risk particularly perverse is
that some 1,500 Americans died in the year following 9/11 precisely because the
nation temporarily shifted from the safest form of travel (flying) to the most
dangerous (driving).222
But what about an apocalyptic scenario, for instance, a nuclear attack leveling
an American city? Although an exact statistic is impossible,223 the risks can be
assessed in light of history and available information in an attempt to make a
rational judgment. One might begin with the fact that the country Islamic jihadists
hate the most, Israel, has never suffered this type of attack.224 In a very real sense,
the Cold War concept of “mutually assured destruction” may still apply, given that
any nation that either uses or provides terrorists such weaponry would be courting
utter annihilation by a nuclear power such as Israel225 or the United States. The
have and could have been prevented. It was an issue of connecting information that was available.”
Rep. John Conyers Jr. Holds a Hearing on Warrantless Surveillance and the FISA Act, Part 6, Jan.
10, 2006, FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, available on Westlaw at 2007 WLNR 18350297 (statement
of Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence).
219
GARDNER, supra note 214, at 252 (“We all know that the old rule of hijackings—stay calm
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220
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suffer at least one terrorist attack each year with the same number of deaths as on September 11, the
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221
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222
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Attacks, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 347 (2006) (estimating number of Americans who died on the road in the
attempt to avoid the fate of the passengers on 9/11). See also GARDNER, supra note 214, at 3.
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See GARDNER, supra note 214, at 257–58.
224
Of course, it can be argued that Israel’s no-holds-barred approach to terrorism has
prevented a WMD attack.
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one group that was able to obtain a weapon of mass destruction on its own—Aum
Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult with greater resources, technological capacity, and
freedom of movement than Al Qaeda—spent years trying to acquire nuclear,
biological, and chemical devices. But it was only able to kill nineteen people using
the nerve agent sarin, casting doubt on the idea that such weaponry can be easily
acquired and deployed.226
Before 9/11, the so-called Gilmore Commission concluded that existing
terrorist organizations (and, for that matter, most nations) lacked the ability and
resources to kill masses of people by biological, chemical, or nuclear/radiological
attack,227 an assessment that has been reaffirmed in the ensuing decade.228 For
instance, a recent report by the U.S. National Intelligence Council acknowledged
that the risk of nuclear weapon use remains very low. The report did provide a
litany of grave threats and important caveats, and its overall tenor was somber.
But it also made the rather unexpected prediction that Al Qaeda may “decay
sooner than many people think” and “support for terrorist networks in the Muslim
world appears to be declining.”229 All in all, terrorism does not appear to be the
type of threat to the nation’s very existence that might justify truly extraordinary
powers or aconstitutional decision-making.230
B. Fear and Politics
On rare occasions, some American politicians have put the danger of
terrorism in perspective. “Calculate the odds of being harmed by a terrorist,”
Senator John McCain wrote in 2004. “It’s about as likely as being swept out to sea
by a tidal wave.”231 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg echoed this
sentiment in 2007: “You have a much greater danger of being hit by lightning than

226
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being struck by a terrorist.”232 Unfortunately, Bloomberg was excoriated for his
honesty, and McCain’s statement proved to be an exception to the prevailing
terrorism rhetoric.233 Fear-mongering has become a powerful campaigning tool, at
times sinking to scurrilous claims about an opponent being soft on terrorism.
Fueled by government propaganda and political opportunism, a collective anxiety
of terrorism overwhelmed the critical thinking skills of the American people.234
Understandably, the initial public response to 9/11 was highly emotional—
anger, grief, and most of all, fear. The coordinated attacks carried profound signal
value for the average citizen, portending grave danger to the national security and
to one’s own personal safety. In the aftermath, nearly nine out of every ten
Americans believed that it was likely that additional attacks would occur in the
coming weeks, and most were at least somewhat worried that they or their families
would be victims of terrorism. This nervous reaction was to be expected given the
horror witnessed by the public, much of it in real-time. What seems surprising,
however, is that the level of fear remained high in the absence of subsequent
attacks. Although the statistics fluctuated between 2002 and 2006, the trendline
was unambiguous—fear of terrorism gradually increased over time.235
For the most part, the abiding nature of this fear stemmed not from
subsequent actions of Al Qaeda or any other cabal. Instead, it was generated by
the U.S. government itself, with Americans repeatedly reminded that 9/11 stood
for more than mass murder. These were not merely “acts of terror” but “acts of
war,”236 representing an existential threat to America and the entire civilized world.
“Freedom and democracy are under attack”237 the public was told, terrorism being
the modern successor to “Hitlerism, militarism, and communism.”238 Likewise,
232

Bloomberg on JFK Plot: ‘Stop Worrying, Get a Life,’ June 4, 2007,
http://wcbstv.com/national/Michael.Bloomberg.JFK.2.284516.html.
233
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Terrorized by “War on Terror”: How a Three-Word Mantra Has
Undermined America, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2007, at B1.
234
As this article approached the end of the editing process, former Homeland Security
Secretary Tom Ridge claimed that he had felt pressured to raise the color-coded terrorism threat level
in 2004 and had wondered whether the action was actually about politics rather than security. See
TOM RIDGE, THE TEST OF OUR TIMES: AMERICA UNDER SIEGE ... AND HOW WE CAN BE SAFE AGAIN
(2009). See also Peter Baker, Bush Official, in Book, Tells of Pressure on ’04 Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2000, at A19; Ron Fournier, Democrats Knocked Off Balance by Terror Alerts, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 4, 2004. Other former Bush Administration officials have adamantly denied Ridge’s
allegations. See Baker, supra; Rumsfeld, Townsend Rebuff Ridge, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 20, 2009,
available at http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/08/bush_security_adviser_rebuffs_ridge.php.
235
See GARDNER, supra note 214, at 249 (“Worry about terrorism did not decline as time
passed and the threatened onslaught failed to materialize; instead, it slowly rose.”).
236
George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Meeting with the National Security Team, Sept. 12,
2001, WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, available on Westlaw at 2001 WLNR
4496205.
237
Id.
238
George W. Bush, Address before a joint session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
Feb. 3, 2003, WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, available on Westlaw at 2003 WLNR

2009]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION

119

the individuals detained in Guantánamo Bay were described as “killers” who
“don’t share the same values we share” and “would like nothing more than to come
after America”; “the worst of a very bad lot,” “devoted to killing millions of . . .
innocent Americans”; and “the most dangerous, best trained, vicious killers on the
face of the earth.”239 The government thus had a “solemn obligation to protect the
people,” to “stay on the offensive,” and to “win the war on terror.”240
According to the government’s newly formed homeland security agency,
“[t]oday’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually any
weapon.”241 Most frightening of all were prophecies of terrorists detonating
weapons of mass destruction. As President Bush warned in 2002, “we cannot wait
for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom
cloud.”242 Aided by rogue regimes, groups like Al Qaeda would employ
biological, chemical, and even nuclear devices to wreak death and destruction in
the United States. “Imagine those nineteen hijackers with other weapons and other
plans,” Bush suggested in his 2003 state of the union address. “It would take one
vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like
none we have ever known.”243 The government would “do everything in [its]
power to make sure that day never comes,”244 which, as it turns out, required law
enforcement to dispense with standard constraints and procedures.245 As was the
case with drug enforcement, the metaphor of war proved to be a potent rhetorical
device to facilitate anti-terrorism efforts and concomitant increases in official
power.246
In the ensuing years, politicians and bureaucrats continued to present
doomsday scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction. In 2005, then-CIA
Director Porter Goss declared that “it may only be a matter of time before al Qaeda
or another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
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weapons,”247 while Vice President Cheney warned of terrorist ambitions “to arm
themselves with weapons of mass destruction . . . and to cause mass death in the
United States.”248 More recently, a congressional commission predicted that “a
weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013,” with one former senator testifying that “the risk of a
nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding.”249 Along the way,
those who disagreed with government actions or challenged their constitutionality
were branded as pro-terrorist. For instance, House Speaker Dennis Hastert said
that Democrats who opposed the Military Commissions Act had “voted in favor of
new rights for terrorists” and would prefer to “gingerly pamper the terrorists who
plan to destroy innocent Americans’ lives.”250
The public anguish was only heightened by media coverage and its repetition
of government claims, often with little journalistic scrutiny. Sometimes news
outlets even exacerbated fears by reporting the merely imaginable as if it were a
looming threat. The result was a type of feedback loop among government
officials, the news media, and the American public that spiraled perceptions of
danger.251 The entertainment industry played a major part as well. The threat of
terrorism provides the perfect plotline for movie thrillers and television dramas,
where overworked and outmanned government agents fight through legal niceties
and bureaucratic redtape to uncover terrorist schemes and diffuse ticking timebombs before cities are eviscerated in a nuclear cloud.252 Eventually, fact may be
conflated with fiction, news with entertainment, the probable with the merely
hypothetical. As a nation, imaginary horrors can transform a free-minded citizenry
into a trembling mass, willing to give up liberty for the sake of safety at the urging
of alarmists and opportunists.253
By all appearances, that is precisely what happened. The government’s
constant reference to terrorists, terrorism, the war on terror, and so on—
reverberating in the echo chamber of modern media—tended to provoke public
anxieties to the point of paranoia. This, in turn, engendered a level of tolerance for
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the aforementioned government activities despite their similarity to the
authoritarian model of criminal justice. It didn’t seem to matter that the
exceptional post-9/11 powers of government were granted even though critical
terms like terrorism were ill-defined and subsequently applied in a troubling
fashion. It was of no moment when government officials employed specious logic,
like FBI Director Robert Mueller testifying that he was “very concerned about
what we are not seeing,”254 thereby converting the lack of evidence into the very
basis for a threat’s existence.255 Nor did the public seem to notice when officials
and commentators used the language of possibility—it may be a matter of time
before a weapon of mass destruction is used, terrorists might try another 9/11-type
plot, one could envision a Mumbai-like attack in an American city, and so on256—
without mentioning the probability of such an incident.257 As a whole, the
American people did not engage in the type of clear-headed analysis, particularly
with regard to the actual risk posed by terrorism, either before or during the
implementation of anti-liberal policies and practices.
The state of fear in America helped make this possible, heightening emotions
and suppressing rational thought, making it simpler for demagogues to muster
popular support for their favored programs.258 Some of the consequences have
been merely nonsensical or irritating,259 the result of politics and bureaucracy as
254
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usual. But others bear a resemblance to disturbing practices of the past,260
including America’s most infamous modern example of individual liberty trumped
by alleged state necessity in an environment of heightened public anxiety: the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. In 1944, the Supreme
Court placed its imprimatur on the removal of more than 110,000 JapaneseAmericans from their homes and their confinement in far-off detention camps.261
Over time, the historical record would show that military officials had exaggerated
the risk of espionage and sabotage, withheld reports concluding that JapaneseAmericans did not present an unusual threat, and generally relied upon grotesque
racial stereotypes and mass hysteria.262 In ensuing decades, the internment order
would be rescinded and convictions vacated, apologies would be given and
relatively token remuneration offered, and the entire episode would be seen as
disgraceful. But the damage to the detainees’ lives could not be undone.
In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision has never been overturned. Dissenting
Justice Frank Murphy denounced the internment policy as depriving individuals of
“their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance
nor support,”263 pointing to the absence of reliable evidence and reasoned analysis.
Instead, the action was founded upon the type of raw fear and prejudice that
supported “the abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by the
dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy.”264 Justice
Robert Jackson also dissented from the decision, arguing that the Court had
“validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of
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transplanting American citizens,” which “then lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need.”265 But these admonitions went unheeded, as have other warnings
against irrational fear and overreaction, with the public succumbing to several
“Red Scares” from World War I through the Cold War-era, vacillating moral
panics about illegal drugs during the twentieth century, and now the war on terror
in the new millennium.
When government actors speak in belligerent terms and individual rights are
beset by claims of necessity, the courts sometimes seem to lack the wherewithal or
confidence to intercede.266 In these circumstances, the only chance may lie with
the people themselves through public pressure and democratic mechanisms,
demanding change and the restoration of rights. One would hope that such
movement comes from a moment of collective sobriety, the populace regaining its
senses, challenging official claims, and engaging in thoughtful deliberation. But
such constitutional crises often stem from a common angst that clouds reality and
disempowers rational decision-making. The writings of individual jurists,
criminologists, and criminal procedure experts may be inaccessible or too obscure
for common citizens and thus politically ineffective. What may be needed is an
alternative narrative that captures the imagination of the public, countering the
impetuous fears about communists, drug offenders, terrorists, and so on. Not
unlike The Crucible and its attempt to stimulate awareness of the McCarthy-era
abuses, a 2006 movie offered a rival vision of the war on terror and a cautionary
tale for the American public.
V. D FOR DYSTOPIA
Remember, remember the fifth of November,
The gunpowder treason and plot.
I know of no reason why the gunpowder treason
Should ever be forgot.
So begins the cinematic version of V for Vendetta,267 with actress Natalie
Portman’s voice reading this first verse of an old British tune, traditionally sung in
memory of a foiled scheme to blow up the seat of power in 1605. The conspiracy
had set its sight on the opening day of Parliament, when lawmakers and other
politicians, the newly enthroned King James I and his family, and much of the
265
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aristocracy would be gathered in the House of Lords to formally commence a new
session of government. “The genesis of the plot is unclear,” one modern report
notes.268 Many historians describe it as a poorly executed attempt by Papal
loyalists to reestablish Catholic reign in England. But some have suggested the
involvement of agents-provocateurs, who hoped to goad a few dupes into an illfated scheme that would only increase popular support for British Protestantism.
“Whatever the truth of the origins of the plot, it must be accepted that most, if not
all, of the conspirators felt that theirs was an honest attempt to root out heresy and
re-establish the true religion.”269
The plot was uncovered before its execution and the conspirators arrested,
including Guy Fawkes, who had been tasked with lighting the slow fuses before
fleeing the country but instead was caught “with a dark lantern and burning
match,” or so the lyrics claim. Fawkes was only a minor player in the larger
conspiracy, yet he would be remembered as a principal and the focus of public
attention, duly enshrined in the second refrain of the British tune:
Guy Fawkes, Guy Fawkes, ‘twas his intent
To blow up the King and Parliament.
Three score barrels of powder below,
Poor old England to overthrow.
Through “God’s providence he was catch’d,” the song continues, alluding to
Fawkes’ trial, conviction, and execution (but not before medieval-style torture).
He would live in infamy for centuries as the lead character in a national holiday
held each November 5th—“Guy Fawkes Night” (also called “Bonfire Night”)—
celebrated in England with fireworks and bonfires burning Fawkes in effigy, all to
commemorate the thwarting of a treasonous bombing. Even Fawkes’ first name
has taken on popular significance: After the event, the word “Guy” was used
colloquially to describe someone with an odd or grotesque appearance (like the
Fawkes effigies), and in contemporary America it has morphed into slang for just
about any man or group of people. In V for Vendetta, however, Guy Fawkes is
cast in a heroic light, providing the inspiration for the story’s protagonist and his
own strike against tyranny in the form of a modern totalitarian regime.
A. V for Vendetta
The dystopian narrative originally appeared as a “graphic novel,” essentially a
comic book on literary steroids.270 Rather than the conventional soft-bound, serial

268

HOUSE OF COMMONS INFORMATION OFFICE, THE GUNPOWDER PLOT, FACTSHEET G8, 2
(2006), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/g08.pdf.
269
Id.
270
ALAN MOORE & DAVID LLOYD, V FOR VENDETTA (K.C. Carlson ed., DC Comics 1988).

2009]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION

125

format associated with superhero tales, graphic novels are longer, often with hard
covers and serious-sounding titles, published by major book presses—and most
importantly, these works typically deal with weighty topics of real-world
significance. As described in a New York Times article, a graphic novel constitutes
“an integrated whole, of words and images both, where the pictures don’t just
depict the story; they’re part of the telling.”271 It affects the reader “almost
subconsciously,” offering “a place of longing, loss, sexual frustration, loneliness
and alienation—a landscape very similar, in other words, to that of so much prose
fiction.”272 The graphic novel is an especially powerful means to convey fear,
distrust, social instability, and alienation.
Alan Moore, the textual author of V for Vendetta, emphasized the importance
of works that rouse the imagination:
We spend a lot of time in these imaginary worlds, and we get to know
them better than the real locations we pass on the street every day . . . .
[T]hey play a more important part in our shaping of the world than we
realize. Hitler, for example, read [the works by nineteenth-century
British science fiction author Edward] Bulwer-Lytton. Osama bin Laden
used to read quite a lot of Western science fiction. That’s why comics
feel important to me. They’re immense fun as a game, but there’s also
something more serious going on.273
Graphic novels aspire to become what the traditional novel once was—a widely
comprehendible, even colloquial medium for the general public.274 They are now
part of popular culture, which, as mentioned, is affected by non-traditional literary
forms, from pictures and paintings, to songs and speeches, to movies and
television. Not unlike the canonical texts of law and literature, these works of
contemporary culture reflect the intuitions and anxieties of modern life, employing
an extended canvas of words and images that can make the shocking disturbingly
familiar.
V for Vendetta fits within this mold. Both the graphic novel and the movie
take place in a futuristic but recognizable setting for Anglo-Americans: England
sometime in the near future.275 The protagonist—known only by the letter “V”—is
an escapee of a post-apocalyptic concentration camp. Although his background is
271
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never fully revealed, the audience is led to believe that V was rounded up with
other undesirables (e.g., minorities, gays, and dissidents) as part of a totalitarian
power grab. In the concentration camp, the inmates are subjected to medical
experiments that kill almost all of the detainees, their dead bodies buried in mass
graves (in the movie) or burnt in furnaces (in the graphic novel). The exception is
V, whose mind and body are transformed by the experiments, which actually
increase his mental and physical acuity. Eventually, he blows up the concentration
camp and escapes to London, where he plots his revenge on those involved in the
inmates’ deaths as well as officials who have browbeaten the British citizenry into
compliance.
Led by a tyrannical dictator,276 the current government rose to power in the
wake of national and international turmoil.277 This justified totalitarian rule, the
regime’s leader argues to his deputies, and the populace must be constantly
reminded of the potential for disaster.
What we need right now is a clear message to the people of this country.
This message must be read in every newspaper, heard on every radio,
seen on every television. This message must resound throughout the
entire Interlink. I want this country to realize that we stand on the edge
of oblivion. I want every man, woman and child to understand how
close we are to chaos. I want everyone to remember why they need
us!278
The masses are cowed by memories of mayhem reiterated by state-run media,
as well as by the regime’s utter disregard for individual liberty, exemplified by the
roundup of undesirables. Particularly important is the regime’s secret police force,
known as “Fingermen,” who exercise free reign in their investigations—including
the power to search, seize, interrogate, detain, torture, and even kill at the agents’
discretion—terrorizing the populace into submission. It is during one of these
police abuses that the audience is introduced to both V and the story’s heroine,
Evey Hammond, a young girl caught after curfew by Fingermen who intend to
rape and possibly kill her. Dressed in a Guy Fawkes mask, V saves Evey that
night and then blows up an important, emblematic government building—
Parliament in the book, the Old Bailey in the movie—all of which occurs on,
appropriately enough, November 5th. In the ensuing weeks and months, V kills
off those responsible for the concentration camp, including the regime’s
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leadership, blowing up other government buildings along the way and inspiring the
people to rise up against their oppressors.
The protagonist’s words and deeds are meant to incite a population that has
been lulled into submission and even co-opted in the fulfillment of inhumane
policies. In the movie, V commandeers the state-run television station and speaks
directly to the public about the totalitarian state they live in and the fear that made
it all possible:
Good evening, London. Allow me first to apologize for this
interruption. I do, like many of you, appreciate the comforts of every
day routine—the security of the familiar, the tranquility of repetition. I
enjoy them as much as any bloke. But in the spirit of commemoration,
thereby those important events of the past usually associated with
someone’s death or the end of some awful bloody struggle, a celebration
of a nice holiday, I thought we could mark this November the 5th, a day
that is sadly no longer remembered, by taking some time out of our daily
lives to sit down and have a little chat.
There are, of course, those who do not want us to speak. I suspect
even now, orders are being shouted into telephones, and men with guns
will soon be on their way. Why? Because while the truncheon may be
used in lieu of conversation, words will always retain their power.
Words offer the means to meaning, and for those who will listen, the
enunciation of truth. And the truth is, there is something terribly wrong
with this country, isn’t there? Cruelty and injustice, intolerance and
oppression. And where once you had the freedom to object, to think and
speak as you saw fit, you now have censors and systems of surveillance
coercing your conformity and soliciting your submission.
How did this happen? Who’s to blame? Well certainly there are
those more responsible than others, and they will be held accountable,
but again truth be told, if you’re looking for the guilty, you need only
look into a mirror. I know why you did it. I know you were afraid.
Who wouldn’t be? War, terror, disease. There were a myriad of
problems which conspired to corrupt your reason and rob you of your
common sense. Fear got the best of you, and in your panic you turned to
the now high chancellor . . . . He promised you order, he promised you
peace, and all he demanded in return was your silent, obedient consent.
Last night I sought to end that silence. Last night I destroyed the
Old Bailey to remind this country of what it has forgotten. More than
four hundred years ago a great citizen wished to embed the fifth of
November forever in our memory. His hope was to remind the world
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that fairness, justice, and freedom are more than words, they are
perspectives.279
Both the graphic novel and the movie reference the perils of public anxiety,
which allows tyrants to deny personal liberty in exchange for safety, or the illusion
thereof. Like other dystopian narratives, they defy the Pollyannaish notion that
people will always oppose totalitarianism and its commands. For instance, the
novel alludes to the infamous Milgram experiments at Yale University,280 where
participants showed an alarming willingness to impose severe pain on others. The
works highlight the ways in which dictatorships come to power and remain as such
through a coordinated, comprehensive system of control over the masses. They
also emphasize that tyranny comes in various forms, from large-scale policies of
repression to the abusive actions of individual agents, who rule their precincts as
petty tyrants. V for Vendetta reminds the audience of its own heritage, where
repressive regimes were overthrown only after revolutionaries were willing to die
to (re)gain freedom from despots. “Beneath this mask there is more than flesh,” V
proclaims after being shot by government agents. “Beneath this mask there is an
idea, and ideas are bulletproof.”281
B. P for Provocative
Both versions of V for Vendetta maintain a sense of familiarity in the midst of
tyranny, a defining feature of dystopic literature. The realistic, almost tangible feel
of these works is not accidental: The graphic novel was written in response to the
conservative policies of the Margaret Thatcher-led British government of the
1980s, while the movie was released at a time when American civil liberties were
being curtailed as part of the world-wide war on terror. As for the latter, it could
have been expected that a major Hollywood production, with parallels to actual
practices (e.g., heightened state surveillance and brutal interrogations), would
provoke citizens on both sides of the Atlantic and be seen as a jab at policymakers,
depicting the potential consequences of governing through fear.282 Some predicted
that the movie would “drive political conservatives crazy”283 and lead right-wing
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commentators “to condemn it as a pro-terrorism piece of garbage.”284 Others,
however, saw it as a “powerful anti-state film” that “digs beneath the surface of
events to reveal the psychological factors—particularly our own fears—and
institutional interests that combine to make tyranny possible.” 285 In this latter
sense, it corresponds with an Anglo-American literary tradition,286 grounded in a
cultural sensitivity to tyrannical rule, deprivations of individual liberty, and the
abuses of law enforcement.287 V for Vendetta also fits within a cinematic genre,
where works of science fiction serve as social metaphors and teaching tools.288
Needless to say, there are limits to applying any form of fictional literature to
the real world, and V for Vendetta is no different. The notion of Guy Fawkes as
hero is quite a change from the traditional British image, which was far closer to
the American depiction of Benedict Arnold (revolutionary turncoat) than, say, John
Brown (failed instigator of slave rebellion). Whether history should treat Fawkes
as valiant or villainous is a matter of interpretation, as well as one of personal
values and social norms. For many, he was a terrorist whose destructive means
were intolerable, despite the violent time-period and regardless of the ends sought.
Today, the bombing of buildings is presumptively contemptible in liberal society.
But others view the incident with a less jaundiced eye and even offer occasional
homage; recently, Fawkes was included on a list of the hundred “greatest Britons,”
for instance, and one popular jibe suggests he was “the only man to ever enter
Parliament with honorable intentions.”289 In both print and celluloid forms, V for
Vendetta conveys some of this tension, which modern culture has captured in the
much-contested saying, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
Several commentators lambasted the movie on precisely this point, arguing it
had turned terrorism into heroism:
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V for Vendetta is a movie about a heroic terrorist. However unjust the
regime he opposes . . . V is a guy who goes around blowing up parts of
London, and he likes his work. That was repugnant enough back when
Moore wrote his comic book, two decades before Sept. 11. It’s become
even more so since last July, when terrorists actually did bomb three
subway trains and a bus in London.290
If the h-for-hype “V for Vendetta” connects with a wide American
audience, then something truly has shifted in the homeland-insecurity
pop landscape of the early 21st Century. It means we’re ready for a
cultured, sophisticated, man-about-town terrorist who espouses the belief
that “blowing up a building can change the world.” Finally, a film to
unite movie-mad members of Al Qaeda with your neighbor’s kid, the one
with the crush on Natalie Portman.291
[W]hat we’re dealing with is a lackluster comic-book movie that thinks
terrorist is a synonym for revolutionary. . . . [T]he movie plays like a
clumsy assault on post-9/11 paranoia. It references “America’s war,”
uses imagery direct from Abu Ghraib and contains dialogue likely to
offend anyone who’s not, say, a suicide bomber.292
Hollywood seems to have had a difficult time distinguishing terrorists
from those trying to defeat them. But in this case, the distinction it fails
to make is between free democratic nations like the U.S. and England on
the one hand, and totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany on the other. Consider this film another example of Hollywood
being AWOL—or even on the other side—in the war on terror.293
Provocative but effective dystopian works could withstand this type of
criticism, with their fundamental purpose bolstered rather than undermined by
claims of neo-heresy. “I often have the feeling that even at the best of times
literary criticism is fraudulent,” wrote George Orwell in 1948, with its flaws only
exacerbated in times of crisis, when “our whole attitude towards literature is
coloured by loyalties which we at least intermittently realize to be non-literary.”294
290
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Government officials are often called upon to use coercive methods out of
necessity, from low-level police investigations of local crime to large-scale
military action against belligerent, even genocidal regimes. Intense emotions like
fear and hatred may lead people to see things in black and white, us versus them, to
pigeonhole rather than analyze, and ultimately, to acquiesce to the state and its
representatives.
At times, nationalism may inhibit a healthy, vigilant suspicion of those in
power. “After Hitler it was difficult to maintain seriously that ‘the enemy is your
own country,’” Orwell once noted.295 People sometimes cling to the idea that
political decision-making involves choices between good and evil, that a
democratic state and its officials can be trusted to do the right thing, and that if
something is deemed necessary it is also morally correct. This belief “belongs to
the nursery.”296
Politics involves choices among competing harms, and
government itself often presents a type of lesser evil. The more fervently a state
claims the need for action or, for instance, the stronger the political backlash
against a particular cultural work, the greater the danger that something has gone
awry and that individual rights and principles of liberal governance are in
jeopardy. In such times, dystopian fiction, political satire, and other forms of
literary resistance against the state can be a blessing to a free society.
The cinematic hero of V for Vendetta is portrayed as an extremely vengeful
yet quite sane revolutionary seeking the end of totalitarian rule by a neoconservative regime. In particular, the movie presents a transparent critique of a
specific instance of state power: the Bush Administration and its post-9/11
policies. Apologists for the erstwhile administration will see any comparison to
the fictional totalitarian regime as supremely unfair, and they may be right. The
analogy between anti-terrorism programs and a cinematic police state is
hyperbolic, of course, and the foregoing critique of the war on terror may seem
polemical in style, written with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and the sobriety that
distance provides.297 Maybe the modern phenomenon of terrorism is in fact
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unique, presenting an existential threat to personal safety, American society, and
Western civilization.298 The United States is not founded upon a suicide pact,299
and there have been times of national peril when officials have disregarded the
Constitution in order to save it (or so it was argued), as when President Lincoln
unilaterally declared war on the South, suspended the writ of habeas corpus,
restricted freedom of speech and the press, and allowed civilians to be tried before
military tribunals.300
I do not question that Al Qaeda is a homicidal menace. The events of 9/11 are
a testament to this, as are the more recent attacks in Bali, London, Madrid, and
Mumbai. Al Qaeda’s methods are brutal and respect no boundaries; its operatives
give up their lives willingly, if not joyfully, and have no qualms about chopping
off the heads of infidels or even killing fellow Muslims if need be. Today’s
terrorists use against liberal society some of its defining features, freedom and
openness, with conservatives and liberals alike predicting another terrorist attack in
the future.301 In fact, as this article was entering the final editing stages, the federal
government had just arrested several individuals and charged one defendant in a
bombing plot that, by all appearances, represents one of the most serious terrorism
cases in years.302 By the time the ink dries on this special issue, some Western
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nation, maybe even the United States, may have suffered a major terrorist incident.
If this happens, all of the constitutionally dubious post-9/11 policies—the
warrantless eavesdropping, the mass internment at Guantánamo Bay, the enhanced
interrogation techniques, and so on—could be vindicated in the eyes of many
Americans, who might call for even more extreme approaches to prevent yet
another attack.
Although remaining doubtful, I am willing to debate the government’s
contentions and underlying analysis about its exceptional programs and practices,
and then judge the case on the merits. For instance, supporters of N.S.A.
wiretapping could argue that it helped bridge the gap between domestic security
and foreign intelligence, intimating that the program may be associated with
(apparently classified) successes. But opponents might point to a report suggesting
that the resulting surveillance had little value, with the program yet to be connected
to any specific counterterrorism achievement.303 As for Guantánamo, those who
would maintain the detention facility can cite a Defense Department report that
claimed dozens of former detainees have returned to terrorism, including a man
who became a central figure in Al Qaeda’s operations in Yemen.304 Yet others
might note that the list overstates the number of terrorism recidivists by including
mere suspects, for instance, as well as non-violent former detainees wanted by the
Saudi government for encouraging resistance against its monarchy.305
Probably the most discussed post-9/11 program, the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques, could also be the most difficult. Advocates can argue the
techniques allowed interrogators to extract actionable intelligence from prominent
Al Qaeda operatives, suggesting that torture may be the only way to prevent
terrorist attacks. Moreover, commentators might contend that few people would
bar coercive interrogation in all circumstances, and some have even argued that the
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state may have a duty to torture in the so-called “ticking time-bomb” scenario.306
But opponents of coercive interrogation—including an F.B.I. agent involved in the
questioning of high-value detainees—cast doubt on whether useful information
was or could be obtained by enhanced interrogation techniques.307 More generally,
they emphasize that torture violates domestic and international law, it alienates the
United States from other nations and serves as a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, and it
is inconsistent with the basic principles of a liberal society (e.g., treating each
individual as worth of respect and dignity).308
Any comprehensive evaluation is well beyond the scope of this article. But it
should be noted that a thorough analysis of these issues will require knowledge of
the relevant facts and detached legal and moral inquiry, and to be worthwhile, any
discussion must go beyond the superficial. No glib assertions that the
government’s policies are “critical” or “vital,”309 for example, or knee-jerk
condemnations of opposing views and cultural works as “pro-terrorist.”310 These
offer nothing more than refrains from the propaganda that facilitated the very
programs at issue. Instead, a meaningful argument would explain in detail why the
government’s actions were both necessary and appropriately tailored to uncover
plots of mass violence. If special or emergency powers are invoked, they must be
applied with prudence and constantly checked for misuse, subjected to judicial
review and the scrutiny of public watchdogs.311 Anti-terrorism efforts may deserve
306
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more money and manpower, but it is entirely appropriate to ask, for instance, why
terrorists (however defined) should be regarded as anything other than criminals
subject to standard criminal processes.312 Although politically or religiously
motivated, oftentimes well-organized and suicidal, and occasionally vast in scale,
their acts are those of “regular” bombers, kidnappers, and murderers. The
wholesale circumvention of constitutional principles would seem to require more,
namely, a threat to the very survival of the republic the Constitution created and
binds.
In a 2004 detention case, the British House of Lords rejected the claim that
any danger of serious physical damage or loss of life necessarily amounts to a
threat to the nation. Taking the long view, Lord Hoffman placed the issue in
historical perspective.
Of course the government has a duty to protect the lives and property of
its citizens. But that is a duty which it owes all the time and which it
must discharge without destroying our constitutional freedoms. There
may be some nations too fragile or fissiparous to withstand a serious act
of violence. But that is not the case in the United Kingdom. When
Milton urged the government of his day not to censor the press even in
time of civil war, he said: “Lords and Commons of England, consider
what nation it is whereof ye are, and whereof ye are the governours.”
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has
survived physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not
underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and
destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we
would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no doubt that we
shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not said that what
happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, threatened the life of their
nation. Their legendary pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence,
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serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our
existence as a civil community.313
Although its history is far shorter than that of England and Spain, the United
States has also faced genuine threats of extinction, whether at the hands of foreign
forces or by the political suicide of civil war. The carnage of 9/11 is unparalleled
in contemporary America, for sure, but the threat it posed to the country does not
compare to the shelling of Fort Sumter, which presented an existential threat to the
United States. Similar dangers arose in 1814 with the British sacking of
Washington, D.C., and the bombing of Pearl Harbor more than a century later.
They symbolized conflicts that could drastically alter or even end the American
polity. The very worst Al Qaeda can do, mass murder, will horrify us as
individuals and as a people, but it cannot destroy the nation—that is, unless we
allow it.
Practices like torture may sacrifice some of the values we seek to preserve,
including respect for human rights. In fighting monsters, to paraphrase Nietzsche,
we must not become monsters ourselves.314 More generally, the policies and
practices adopted in times of perceived crisis are indicative of a government’s
character. In a liberal constitutional democracy, the ends do not always (or even
usually) justify the means. Instead, there are limits to what a decent regime can do
to an individual in pursuit of the general welfare. The truth must be pursued, of
course, but not by resorting to the modern equivalents of the rack and screw or
employing high-tech writs of assistance. It may seem that America is forced to
fight at a disadvantage, tied down by the Constitution, but the principles of liberty
and the rule of law enshrined in that document are core elements of the security it
provides us all.315 When politicians and common citizens are prepared to surrender
these principles, Milton’s admonition remains relevant as a call for deliberation
about who we are as a people and what we stand for as a nation. As Americans,
for that matter, we might keep in mind Benjamin Franklin’s adage that those who
surrender basic liberty for temporary safety may be worthy of neither.316
Some will scoff at any alleged tension, believing that liberty and safety are
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perfectly reconcilable. It is hard to tell how this proves possible—at least if liberty
has as its core value freedom from state intrusions, like police searches and
seizures, and the governmental means to achieve safety involve intrusions on
privacy and autonomy. Perhaps the claim is that the deprivations of liberty are
only minor and will be short-lived, a difficult argument to make in light of brutal
interrogation policies and the creation of a penal colony.317 Moreover, the various
domestic spying programs may yet turn out to be the greatest instance of mass
government surveillance in American history. And even if such actions were
somehow deemed minor, experience has shown that small infringements on
freedom have a generative effect, allowing more and greater deprivations of
liberty. The ever-expanding powers of drug enforcement to invade personal
privacy offer a modern example of this long-recognized danger.318
Maybe the best argument in favor of a terrorism exception is that in times of
war individual rights must give way to national security, and eventually greater
liberty ensues through victorious military campaigns. A decade ago, Chief Justice
Rehnquist analyzed wartime restrictions on civil liberties, concluding that “reason
and history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order—
in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten the
national well-being.”319 Likewise, Michael Klarman argued that “American wars
often have advanced the cause of particular freedoms, especially by expanding the
pool of beneficiaries,” and that total wars, “like the Civil War and World War II,
undermine traditional patterns of status and behavior.”320
One must again ask whether the war on terror (or any other symbolic conflict,
like the drug war) is comparable to the Civil War, for instance, a real “shooting
war” that literally divided the United States in two and resulted in more than
600,000 deaths. A similar question arises when analogies are drawn between the
threat of terrorism and that posed in World War II, given that Nazi Germany and
its allies were responsible for millions of deaths on battle fields and in
concentration camps. And although anti-terror programs may increase safety, it is
not obvious to me that these efforts will increase liberty; to put it bluntly, there are
317
See, e.g., Perlez et al., supra note 167; Scott Shane, Remarks on Torture May Force New
Administration’s Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A12.
318
See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, GENERAL DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted in 11
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 79 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977) (“Since the
general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom
of the people, by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden
usurpations.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (“It may be that it is the obnoxious
thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure.”).
319
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 222
(1998).
320
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 265, 274–76 (2000) (reviewing ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998)).
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no slaves to be freed and no concentration camps to be razed. No doubt, there are
people who will give their lives to harm the United States without any concern for
the innocent. But there were Soviets (and their supporters) who were equally
fanatical in the name of communism, with the stakes of the Cold War being
genuinely apocalyptic and far more dangerous than any threat posed by Al Qaeda.
Though horrifying by definition, terrorism need not be existential. As of now,
given the information currently available, a convincing case has not been made for
a categorical exemption of anti-terror investigations and prosecutions from the
strictures of the Constitution.321
Some believed that any constitutional crisis was resolved in the 2008 election,
with past abuses to be remedied or at least carefully reviewed by the new
administration, which supposedly would employ its 9/11-enhanced powers only as
necessary to prevent terrorist violence. Certainly, President Obama’s inaugural
address raised the hopes of many:
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our
safety and our ideals. Our founding fathers, faced with perils that we can
scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights
of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals
still light the world, and we will not give them up for expediency’s
sake.322
During the presidential campaign, Obama promised to address some of the
most pressing concerns of civil libertarians and human rights organizations by,
among other things, disavowing extant detention policies, closing the Guantánamo
internment camp and the C.I.A.’s secret prisons, and barring extreme interrogation
techniques that amount to torture. Indeed, within days of his inauguration the new
president issued executive orders banning torture and promising to shut down the
facility in Cuba and covert prisons elsewhere.323 Likewise, the new Attorney
321
See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Search for Terrorists: Why “Public Safety” is Not a Special Need,
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing against a blanket terrorism exception to Fourth Amendment).
Cf. SIMON, supra note 187, at 265 (“Many of the deformations in American institutions produced by
the war on crime, developments that have made our society less democratic, are being publicly
rejustified as responses to the threat of terror.”).
322
Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 2009, WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS, available on Westlaw at 2009 WLNR 5793905.
323
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Ensuring Lawful
Interrogations”); Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Review and
Disposition of Individuals Detained At the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention
Facilities”); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Review of Detention Policy
Options”). See also Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC.,
available on Westlaw at 2009 WLNR 5793969 (Feb. 24, 2009); Mark Mazzetti & William
Glaberson, Obama Will Shut Guantánamo Site and C.I.A. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1;
Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantánamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2009, at
A2.
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General, Eric Holder, stated that the previous administration’s most notorious antiterrorism practices had been changed or were under review, releasing previously
confidential legal memorandum, testifying before Congress that water-boarding
was torture, and ultimately appointing a veteran prosecutor to investigate claims of
C.I.A. prisoner abuses and its destruction of interrogation videotapes.324
Moreover, the Justice Department abandoned the term “enemy combatant” in
classifying detainees, began filing criminal charges in federal court against alleged
terrorists rather than detaining them indefinitely, and issued new guidelines
limiting the use of the state secrets privilege.325 In turn, the Pentagon closed its
propaganda-producing office and agreed to expand review of detainees in
Afghanistan.326
Not every decision has been viewed as positive by civil liberties groups,
however, and in general the message from the new administration has not been
entirely consistent. Since assuming office, President Obama has selected his
words carefully,327 although during the presidential campaign he adopted some of
the warfare rhetoric employed by the Bush Administration, leading to speculation
that some controversial policies might remain intact.328 In fact, his inaugural
address declared that “our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of
violence and hatred,” telling terrorists that “[w]e will defeat you.”329 Subsequent
statements and actions have led some to argue that President Obama had reneged
on his campaign promise “to restore our Constitution and the rule of law,” with no
significant break from the past on some issues and mere cosmetic changes on
others.330
324
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TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at A1; Josh Meyer, Holder Calls Waterboarding Torture, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2009, at A10; Liz Halloran, Holder Says He’ll Jettison Bush-Era Practices, NPR, Jan. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story/php?storyId=99377871; Mazzetti & Shane,
supra note 172.
325
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Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2009, A1.
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2009.
328
See, e.g., This Week with George Stephanopolous: Exclusive Interview with President-Elect
Barack
Obama,
(ABC
television
broadcast
Jan.
11,
2009),
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/Video/playerIndex?id=6624066; Adam Liptak, Early Test of Obama View On
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For instance, the current administration has asserted its authority to
indefinitely detain suspected terrorists without trial; to continue transferring
prisoners to countries that ignore legal rights or to simply rely upon such nations to
capture, interrogate, and detain terrorist suspects; and to resume Guantánamo-style
military commissions.331 Also controversial were decisions to bar the release of
photographs documenting prisoner abuses in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
C.I.A.’s refusal to disclose further documents regarding its detention and enhanced
interrogation program.332 Most recently, the Obama Administration conceded that
it might not be able to meet its pledge to close Guantánamo by the beginning of
2010, and it has asked federal lawmakers to reauthorize three provisions of the
Patriot Act.333 The former may be understandable given practical difficulties in
shuttering a detention facility and relocating detainees, as well as the recalcitrance
of the president’s own party on this issue.334 But the administration’s support for
the Patriot Act might be especially discouraging to civil libertarians and
progressives, not least of all because of past statements by then-Senator Obama
that the surveillance law was “shoddy.”335
TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A3; Josh Gerstein, Legal Left Cools Toward Obama, POLITICO, Apr. 13,
2009, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21207.html; Charlie Savage, Obama’s
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331
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N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at A8; David Johnston, Rights Cited in U.S. Trials of Detainees, N.Y.
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Detainees Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at A13.
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In the end, neither conservatives nor liberals are completely averse to the
arrogation power or reluctant to use public fear to achieve their ambitions. And it
is on this point that V for Vendetta, especially the book version, offers a valuable
caveat. Fascism, not neo-conservatism, was the target of the original text,336 which
could be seen as a critique of all forms of state tyranny regardless of theoretical
underpinnings. No less than modern conservatism, the progressivism or neoliberalism of the new left carries its own threats of government overreaching. As
Orwell argued, “the mere sound of words ending in -ism seems to bring with it the
smell of propaganda.”337 History has shown that abuses of power are not limited to
any particular political philosophy. “If we find ourselves in ten years’ time
cringing before [a state censor],” Orwell admonished, “it will probably be because
that is what we have deserved.”338 Good dystopian fiction reminds readers to be
wary of encroachments upon individual liberty, regardless of the source or its
intentions, and to push back if necessary.339
For many Americans, cautious optimism will remain in order during the first
few years of the Obama Administration. But if there is to be a vanguard defending
civil liberties in times of public anxiety—especially when the issue is the
protections accorded suspects, detainees, and criminal defendants—it is unlikely to
be those who wield vast political power. History will confirm that the forerunners
of restored rights and the rule of law were individual agents and prosecutors who
turned down unlawful shortcuts and rejected unfair procedures, whistleblowers
who refused to remain mum about clandestine abuses, and jurists who were
unwilling to place their imprimatur on unconstitutional actions.340 These
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individuals may not be able to check all government excesses in periods of
perceived crisis, nor will they inevitably kindle the imagination of the public, the
one body that can force large-scale change in a functional democracy. Yet their
deeds can reveal the truth and place a spotlight on specific policies and practices,
and maybe with the help of compelling counter-narratives in literature and culture,
the public will decline government promises of order and peace in return for its
silent, obedient consent.341
Dystopian fiction—from classics like Nineteen Eighty-Four to modern works
like V for Vendetta—are only meditations about possibilities, not statements of
present fact or future certainty. Orwell made this precise point immediately after
his masterpiece was published:
I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive,
but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that
something resembling it could arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas
have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried
to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. The scene of the
book is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking
races are not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, if
not fought against, could triumph anywhere.342
A dystopian world need not and probably will not come to fruition in the
United States. But the same can be said about the vision of a mushroom cloud, or
any other horrifying image, utilized by officials in support of their enhanced
powers. With provocative mental pictures at a rough equipoise—apocalyptic
terrorism versus totalitarian society—the public is challenged to evaluate critically
whether claims of necessity justified a curtailment of civil liberties. Dystopian
literature can remind people of past abuses of power and previous fights to defeat
tyranny and prevent its regeneration, forcing them to compare their present reality
against both the history of despotism and the literature’s dystopian image of
society. These works present the audience with provocative questions: whether
people will recognize tyranny before it becomes entrenched; whether foundational
documents and legal doctrines will prevent tyrannical government, embodied in
far-reaching policies and discrete, street-level decisions; or whether the people

review. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
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immunity claim in civil suit for unlawful detention under material witness statute); Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting broad claim of state security
privilege in civil suit regarding extraordinary rendition).
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themselves will facilitate their own enslavement, either through their affirmative
involvement or simple acquiescence to an abusive state.
VI. CONCLUSION
So did V for Vendetta have an impact on the public imagination, or was it “a
piece of pulp claptrap”?343 Putting aside artistic criticisms (and there were many),
there are good reasons to be skeptical about the movie’s significance. Any new
light placed on anti-terrorism policies would have occurred irrespective of
particular literary or cultural challenges to the narrative of fear.344 If change occurs
under the new administration, the initial spark will have been an aggregate
dissatisfaction with the federal government, with a failing economy at home and
perceived military quagmires abroad playing far greater roles than, say, a
collective rejection of torture. More generally, whatever effect V for Vendetta had
on the imagination is trivial compared to the impact of Uncle Tom’s Cabin on the
debate over slavery, or the influence of The Jungle on food-safety reform. It will
never achieve the significance of Nineteen Eighty-Four in popular discourse about
totalitarianism. Nor is it liable to become widely identified with a particular period
of American history in the way that The Crucible is linked with the McCarthy era.
What V for Vendetta offered was a contemporary dystopian narrative to
contrast with government propaganda, at a time when fear suppressed sound
reasoning and rendered impotent the arguments of legal doctrine and social
science. Regardless of the movie’s effect, then, the context in which it was
received by the audience was representative of both the limits and possibilities of
interdisciplinarity. In more “ordinary” times, the incorporation of criminological
theory and empiricism into criminal law and procedure is considered beneficial
and, for the most part, politically feasible. When public anxieties override reason,
however, and criminal justice becomes the arena for demagoguery, the best
response to doctrinal distortions and rights curtailments may come not from legal
theorists and social scientists, but instead from artists who can inspire the public
imagination.
To be clear, disciplinary expansion and interaction is not always seen as an
unmitigated good.345 Among others, Posner warns that “too many bells and
whistles will stop the analytic engine in its track,” undermining those models that
require studious reflection before abandoning a more straightforward approach and
the conclusions that follow.346 Law and literature receives a far greater indictment,
343
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Audience, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2006, at C1.
344
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345
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however: It is simply irrelevant to sound legal and moral analysis, critics argue,
lacking any meaningful capacity for good or evil, and without the power to
improve legal professionals through ethical lessons and insights.347 Nor can
literary and cultural pieces supply the type of information imparted by social
science. Although Epstein acknowledges that such works may make someone
“sensitive to the ravages of poverty,” for instance, they offer no information about
economic changes over time and across places, or the effect poverty has on
demographic variables like average life-span.348
Literary and cultural works are non-falsifiable, of course, and the lawliterature enterprise has no concrete standards akin to research protocols. As such,
concerns might be raised that inherently subjective works of fiction are being
treated as scientific studies. After all, V for Vendetta, or even an acclaimed piece
like Nineteen Eighty-Four, might be described as a form of propaganda, not
altogether different from that promulgated by government in support of increasing
its power, with the fictional texts serving as a sort of “secret police”349 of the mind.
In fact, Orwell wrote of his own subjectivity, once warning readers to “beware of
my partisanship, my mistakes and the distortion inevitably caused by having seen
only one corner of events.”350 And needless to say, Orwell was well aware of the
danger of propaganda and historical revisionism; as he remarked during World
War II, “Hitler can say that the Jews started the war, and if he survives that will
become official history.”351
But there are some essential differences between state propaganda and
fictional literature: The former claims to be the truth, promulgated by an entity
KENT L. REV. 57, 62 (1989). Specifically, Posner was challenging the idea that psycho-social
variables would improve the economic model of behavior. Others object to the sloppy tendencies of
interdisciplinary research, with scholars “trawling other disciplines for useful theories, methods, and
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methodological flaws of their approach and sloppy results that ensue. Ken Wissoker, Negotiating a
Passage Between Disciplinary Boundaries (2000), reprinted as adapted in AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION TRANSFORMED, supra note 4, at 285–86. It has even been claimed that certain areas are
too serious to be left in the hands of amateurs from foreign disciplines, while specific topics, like the
Holocaust, are predisciplinary, “too painful, too historic, too terrible,” to be the subject to any type of
analysis whatsoever. Marjorie Garber, Coveting Your Neighbor’s Discipline (2001), reprinted as
adapted in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION TRANSFORMED, supra note 4, at 290 (paraphrasing
argument of others).
347
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PROSE, 1939–1948, at 348 (Edward Mendelson ed., 2002). See also Weisberg, supra note 77, at 1
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with an interest in amassing power and exerting more control over the individual.
By contrast, there is no assertion of facticity in the latter, which is properly labeled
a work of the imagination and generally produced by individuals hoping to inspire
thought rather than suppress it, stimulating the audience to seek the truth instead of
spreading deception. As discussed, some literary genres invite readers to
reexamine their world as personally perceived or represented by the professed
brokers of reality—government, news media, industry, et cetera—in light of the
image of life portrayed in a fictional work. In particular, dystopian fiction calls on
the audience to imagine a future regime that maintains totalitarian control over the
individual. It does not overtly question whether the image comports with current
reality; England was never the “Airstrip One” of Nineteen Eighty-Four or the
fascist dictatorship described in V for Vendetta. Instead, these works admonish
readers to be wary of the precursors of totalitarianism and, of special relevance
here, the gradual degeneration of criminal justice into an authoritarian system.
As mentioned above, dystopian fiction merely presents the plausible, not the
likely or preordained. Moreover, it may be impossible to prove that a given
literary or cultural piece served as a “self-preventing prophesy,”352 helping to avoid
disaster by raising public awareness. On the other hand, however, the nightmare
scenarios of terrorism are only plausibilities, too—not the inevitable consequence
of America’s failure to expand government powers or to forego individual rights
and established procedures. Nor can it be denied that Nineteen Eighty-Four and
similar works prompted a greater awareness of authoritarian behavior and the
dangers of concentrated power.353 These pieces encourage readers to critically
examine whether fundamental values are being sacrificed or distorted, often
underscoring the importance of objective truth. This idea was central to Orwell,
whose writings were motivated by the danger of historical revision by those in
power.354
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Some things are factual—Orwell’s axiom that “two plus two make four,”355 or
Arendt’s exemplar that “[i]n August 1914 Germany invaded Belgium.”356
Although these illustrations are very different, one mathematical and the other
historical, “once perceived as true and pronounced to be so, they have in common
that they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent.”357 They are not the
product of government edicts; their truth is neither subject to nor undermined by
official statements. To be sure, the latter fact, that Germany invaded Belgium at
the beginning of World War I, “concerns events and circumstances in which many
are involved” and “is established by witnesses and depends on testimony.”358 And
more generally, we can debate the political and socio-economic origins of what
some believed to be the war to end all wars. But a free society governed by liberal
constitutional democracy cannot be built upon factual lies, like the idea that the
First World War began when Belgium invaded Germany.359
355

“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four,” Winston Smith wrote in his
diary. “If that is granted, all else follows.” ORWELL, supra note 130, at 81. While torturing Smith,
however, O’Brien rejects this mathematical truth: “Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are
three. Sometimes they are all of them at once.” Id. at 250–51. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, “the very
existence of external reality was tacitly denied by [the Party’s] philosophy,” and “[t]he heresy of
heresies was common sense.” Id. at 80. For Orwell, this was one of the defining characteristics of
modern totalitarian regimes:
Nazi theory indeed specifically denies that such a thing as “the truth” exists . . . . The
implied objective of this line of thought is a nightmare world in which the Leader, or
some ruling clique, controls not only the future but the past. If the Leader says of such
and such an event, “It never happened,” well, it never happened. If he says that two and
two are five, well, two and two are five. This prospect frightens me much more than
bombs, and after our experiences of the last few years that is not a frivolous statement.
GEORGE ORWELL, Looking Back on the Spanish War, in MY COUNTRY RIGHT OR LEFT, supra note
132, at 258–59.
356
HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
240 (1993) (1961). Arendt’s example is based on French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau’s
answer as to what future historians would say about World War I: “They will not say that Belgium
invaded Germany.” But cf. JACQUES DERRIDA, WITHOUT ALIBI 293 (Peggy Kamuf ed. & trans.,
2002).
357
ARENDT, supra note 356, at 240.
358
Id. at 238.
359
See JEFFREY C. GOLDFARB, THE POLITICS OF SMALL THINGS: THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS
IN DARK TIMES 17 (2006).
Modern liberal democracy requires a separation of politics from philosophical truth, but it
must be based upon factual truths in order for those who meet in public to share a
common world in which they can interact politically. Modern tyranny is based on a kind
of philosophical truth, an ideology, an official interpretation of facts; factual truth is, as a
matter of principle, expendable.
Id. Consider also Harry Frankfurt’s comments about the nature of truth:
No one in his right mind would rely on a builder, or submit to the care of a physician,
who does not care about the truth . . . . [In] all of these contexts, there is a clear
difference between getting things right and getting them wrong, and thus a clear
difference between the true and the false. It is frequently claimed, to be sure, that the
situation is different when it comes to historical analyses and to social commentaries, and
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Which brings us back to the paradoxical power of some works of fiction—
their ability to rouse an ethic of truthseeking.360 Orwell’s own subjectivity, his
“feeling of partisanship” and “a sense of injustice,” inspired him to write for the
sake of truth: “[T]here is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I want
to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing.”361 By illustrating the
consequences of a world where facts are subject to manipulation, dystopian works
forewarn society that truth may fall by wayside if “all the facts have to fit with the
words and prophecies of some invincible fuhrer.”362 In this context, stimulating
the popular imagination is not a means to undermine legal, theoretical, and
empirical analysis. To the contrary, it may provoke otherwise passive citizens to
seek the truth, to question the claims and actions of government, and to demand
detailed justifications consistent with established law and scientific knowledge.
This is exceptionally important for criminal justice, the knife’s edge of state
power.363 Criminology can provide an empirical basis for legal decision-making;
works of literature and culture can make the doctrine and science of criminal
justice more salient for the average citizen; and in the end, both may be necessary
to ensure that objective truth and fundamental values are not surrendered in fits of
irrationality.

especially when it comes to the evaluations of people and of policies that these analyses
and commentaries generally include . . . . There are important limits, however . . .
concerning the range of variation in interpreting the facts that serious historians, for
instance, may be expected to display. There is a dimension of reality into which even the
boldest—or the laziest—indulgence of subjectivity cannot dare to intrude.
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON TRUTH 24–26 (2006).
360
Ernest Hemingway once said that “a writer should be of as great probity and honesty as a
priest of God.” Ernest Hemingway, Introduction, in MEN AT WAR: THE BEST WAR STORIES OF ALL
TIME xv (1942).
A writer’s job is to tell the truth. His standard of fidelity to the truth should be so high
that his invention, out of his experience, should produce a truer account than anything
factual can be. For facts can be observed badly; but when a good writer is creating
something, he has time and scope to make it of an absolute truth . . . . [I]f he ever writes
something which he knows in his inner self is not true, for no matter what patriotic
motives, then he is finished . . . . [H]e will never be at peace with himself because he has
deserted his one complete obligation.
Id.
361
ORWELL, Why I Write, supra note 132, at 6.
362
ORWELL, Letter to H.J. Willmett, supra note 351, at 149.
363
Cf. DAVID H. BAYLEY, PATTERNS OF POLICING: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS
189 (1985).

